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ABSTRACT 
 
Disability in South African labour law is reduced to incapacity. An evaluation of disability and 
incapacity was made to advocate a clear conceptual break between the two concepts. Also, that 
disability should be grounded in a social model paradigm of disability which was a materialist 
critique of how capitalism constructs disability. To enhance the analysis discourse analysis was 
employed to illustrate how language, ideology and power sustained the notion of disability in 
capitalist society.  A comparative analysis was made drawing on American disability 
jurisprudence and Canadian disability jurisprudence to illustrate the difference in approach 
between the two legal systems with a suggestion that the Canadian approach was better suited to 
the development of a South African disability law. And the development of South African disability 
law it was argued would benefit if a legal construction of disability was crafted to deal with the 
obstacles that disabled people encounter in the work-place. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1 The Constitution1 
Since the inception of the Constitution notions of equality, human dignity, freedom and 
justice form the bedrock of our democracy.  The Preamble to the Constitution alludes to 
the idea of a ―society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human 
rights‖2 It envisages a society which is democratic and open, where every citizen is 
equally protected by law. It also commits itself to ―improve the quality of life of all citizens 
and to free the potential of each person‖ The Founding Provisions of The Constitution, 
once again, iterate the idea of human dignity and equality, and the advancement of 
human rights and freedom. Significantly, especially in section 3, is the idea of a common 
South African citizenship;3 a citizenship that is informed by the equal entitlement of all 
South Africans to rights, privileges and benefits. These entitlements are, however, 
tempered by reciprocal duties and responsibilities that as a matter of course flow from 
citizenship. Chapter Two of the Constitution encompasses the Bill of Rights that 
―enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic values of 
human dignity, equality and freedom‖4.  
 
Section 7(2) compels the state to protect, promote and fulfill the rights found in the Bill of 
Rights. The Bill of Rights makes it imperative that the state is seen to be upholding and 
enforcing the provisions contained in the Bill of Rights. Section 9 of the Bill of Rights 
contains the equality clause that underscores the notion that ―everyone is equal before 
the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law‖5. Section 9(3) spells 
out what is meant by section 9(1), by stressing that equality means that ―[t]he state may 
                                                 
1
 Act 108 of 1996 
2
 Ibid, p.1 
3
 Ibid, p. 3 
4
 Ibid, s 7(1) p. 6 
5
 Ibid  s 9(1) 
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not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, 
including race, gender, sex, …ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation age, 
disability‖ etc.  This section, however, is not absolute; it is tempered by section 9(5) 
which states that discrimination on all the grounds adumbrated by section 9(3) will be 
considered to be unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair6.  Section 10 
is crafted in the form of an injunction that categorically states that ―everyone has inherent 
dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected‖.   
 
These various provisions of the Constitution highlight the democratic, freedom 
guaranteeing, discrimination condemning thrust of the Constitution. It is a Constitution 
that sets out to ensure that the human dignity of all South African citizens are 
guaranteed, that discrimination in any form will be eradicated, that freedom and equality 
are the cornerstones of every person‘s existence and where discrimination is allowed 
that that discrimination must be fair.  Everybody without reservation has inherent human 
dignity, and the Constitution guarantees it.  
 
1.2 Employment Equity Act7 
 
The enactment of the Employment Equity Act No. 55 of 1998 (EEA) was significant in 
that what was stated generally and expansively, and which laid the foundations with 
regard to equality, human dignity and freedom, in the Constitution, is particularized in the 
EEA. The EEA, using the cornerstones of the Constitution, clearly sets the parameters 
for the exercise of these important ideals squarely within the ambit of the workplace. 
                                                 
6
 Ibid  s 9(5)  
7
 Act 55 of 1998 
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Given the history of racial discrimination in South Africa, the main thrust of the EEA is to 
address the problems of discrimination in the workplace.  
 
Section 5 of the EEA speaks to the prohibition of unfair discrimination, and obliges every 
employer to promote equal opportunities in the workplace by eliminating unfair 
discrimination.  Section 6 goes further and spells out in a comprehensive manner what 
are considered to be the bases of unfair discrimination.8 
 
1.3 The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act9 
 
In 2000 the above Act was enacted and it further expanded on the state‘s intention to 
eradicate discrimination of any kind. Section 6 very clearly states that ―neither the state 
nor any person may unfairly discriminate against any person‖ Section 9 of the Act 
speaks specifically to unfair discrimination on grounds of disability and raises three very 
crucial areas that need to be observed when dealing with disabled people. Section 9(a) 
brings to the fore the whole idea of supporting or enabling facilities necessary for the 
functioning of disabled people in society. Section 9(b) speaks to environment 
accessibility, and provides that anybody who contravenes SABS standards that ensure 
an accessible environment for disabled people will be considered to have unfairly 
discriminated against disabled people. And section 9(c) requires persons to eliminate 
obstacles which prevent disabled people from enjoying equal opportunities, and provides 
that anything short of this would make such persons liable to unfair discrimination 
                                                 
8
 Section 6(1) states: No person may unfairly discriminate, directly or indirectly, against an 
employee, in any employment policy or practice, on any one or more grounds, including race, 
gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, family responsibility, ethnic or social  origin, colour sexual 
orientation, age, disability, religion, HIV status, conscience, belief, political opinion, culture 
language and birth. 
9
 Act 4 of 2000 
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against disabled persons. This section is also of the view that steps to make reasonable 
accommodation should be seriously considered when taking the needs of disabled 
people into account. 
   
Notwithstanding, the important considerations of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the 
EEA and the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 
(PEPUDA), problems of discrimination still exist. And these problems invariably manifest 
themselves in all quarters of South African life, not least of which is within the confines of 
an important terrain of human activity, namely, the workplace.  
 
The thrust of this study is to look at disability specifically as an under considered 
discriminated against category within the context of the workplace. The focus will 
essentially home in on the implications that incapacity and disability will have for 
dismissal. There is a perception that a dismissal for incapacity is less onerous for an 
employer than a dismissal for disability, and with a jurisprudence essentially based on 
incapacity dismissals the possibilities exist that the intentions of the EEA and PEPUDA 
may not become a reality. Let it be said at the outset that South Africa does not have a 
rich jurisprudential history with respect to disability discrimination within the workplace. 
South Africa‘s history is not based within the theoretical confines and discourses of 
disability as a socially determined and occurring construct. It rather has its history 
located within the conceptual home of incapacity. And a legal system, in its attempts to 
address issues of disability, is unable to do so adequately if its understanding of 
disability is historically reified within the limiting conceptual confines of incapacity. It will 
further be shown that latter day attempts to speak about disability, or to conceptualize it, 
have been loosely and unconsciously defined within terms of incapacity. And this does 
not bode well for our jurisprudence with regard to disability, if we are to re-conceptualize 
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disability as a socially constructed and socially interpreted social category. Hence an 
appropriate starting point to this study would be to analyze the origins and evolution of 
the term ‗incapacity‘ and how it relates to ‗disability‘ with the express aim to evaluate its 
worthiness as an explanatory tool.  
2. AIM OF THE STUDY  
The aim of the study is to analyze the concepts ‗incapacity‘ and ‗disability‘ and what they 
mean with regard to dismissal in South African labour law. 
3. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This research will analyze the notion of disability and how it is used within the context of 
South African labour jurisprudence. It is contended that the notion of disability is viewed 
through the lens of incapacity. There is no clear distinction made in the use of these two 
concepts. A concept can be viewed as a repository of interrelated thoughts that imbues 
one with a particular defined outlook in the material world. And for one to be clear on 
what it is that one is looking for in the material world, the concept that one is dealing with 
should be clearly defined. The concept should contain the necessary essentials to 
enhance the explanatory power of the concept. Unfortunately, incapacity and disability 
as concepts do not lend themselves to clarity and clear definition within the South 
African jurisprudential context; hence the interchangeable use of the two terms which 
invariably leads to a diminishing of their explanatory power.  
 
When used or applied in labour law no conceptual distinction is made between the two 
terms. And a cursory reading of South African textbooks, case law, assorted legislation 
and scholarly writings, clearly displays a tendency to conceptually enmesh the two 
concepts.  
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These two concepts have marked and distinct conceptual starting points states Marylyn 
Christianson when referring to items 10 and 11 of the Labour Relations Act‘s Code of 
Good Conduct: Dismissal:  
―The use of ‗disability‘ in items 10 and 11 would suggest that it is used interchangeably, or 
synonymously, with incapacity. No real distinction has been made between the two concepts. It is 
submitted that there are indeed distinct differences between disability and incapacity‖
10
.  
Charles Ngwena and Loot Pretorius agree with this observation when they say that:  
 
―Employer‘s views about disability are often rooted in stereotypic assumptions about the 
incapacities rather than the capacities of people with disabilities. The tendency has been to view 
disability as coterminous
11
 with incapacity…‖
12
  
 
Textbook writers like Fanie van Jaarsveld and Stefan van Eck, on the other hand, do not 
even try to make the distinction between incapacity and disability. In their textbook13 a 
section entitled ―Incapacity or Disability of Employee‖ and the content14 thereof bears 
                                                 
10
 Marylyn Christiansen ―Incapacity and disability: A retrospective overview of the last 25 years‖ 
(2004) 25 Industrial Law Journal  p889  
11 Having the same boundaries or extent ( in space, time or meaning) The Concise Oxford 
Dictionary 9ed p303  
12
 Charles Ngwena and Loots Pretorius ―Code of Good Practice on the Employment of People 
with Disabilities: An Appraisal‖ Industrial Law Journal  (2003) 24 p1818 
13
  Fanie van Jaarsveld and Jan van Eck  Principles of Labour Law; (2002) p 208 
 
14
 Incapacity or Disability of Employee 
General principles Cases of disability or incapacity render an employee temporarily or 
permanently incapable of making his services available’’ must be distinguished from cases of 
incompetence and incompatibility. A distinction must be drawn between: 
(i) physical disability as a result of ill-health or injury: 
(ii) mental incapacity, for instance as a result of stress or illness, or intellectual impairment: and 
(iii) chronic diseases resulting in habitual absenteeism, asthma, tuberculosis, alcoholism, 
depression, etc - 
‗The disability may prevent the employee from rendering his services satisfactorily or at all. There 
is a greater duty on an employer to accommodate an employee where his disability was caused 
by a work-related injury or illness. Any discrimination based on the incapacity of an employee 
resulting in his dismissal would constitute an automatically unfair dismissal 
 Procedure An employer is under a duty first to try and reasonably accommodate an employee 
suffering from incapacity or disability before deciding to dismiss such employee. If it appears that 
an employee is temporarily unable to perform, for a period that is unreasonably long, alternatives 
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this out. To illustrate this: a coordinating conjunction ―or‖ is used between the words 
―incapacity‖ and ―disability‖. And coordinating conjunctions are usually used to join two 
items of equal syntactic importance.15 Syntax can be understood to mean a grammatical 
arrangement of words, showing their connection and relationship16.  The conjunction ―or‖ 
can also be used as a synonym or explanation for a particular word17. If we are to take 
into consideration an understanding of how the word ―or‖ is used and apply it to the 
phrase ―Incapacity or Disability of Employee‖, there are strong suggestions that the 
writers of this phrase intended the two words to be used to convey the same meaning, 
they are coordinating two words of equal syntactic importance. The fact that they used 
―or‖, a coordinating conjunction between ―incapacity‖ and ―disability‖ means that they 
have attached equal weight or value to the use of the two words, that there exists a 
connectivity and an interrelatedness between the two words. The other understanding of 
the word ―or‖ is where it introduces a synonym or explanation of a preceding word, for 
example, ―suffered from vertigo or giddiness‖18. In this example ―giddiness‖,19 being the 
synonym for ―vertigo‖,20 suggests ―dizziness‖ and ―the tendency to fall‖. If one takes this 
construction of the coordinating conjunction ―or‖ in the example given above, and applies 
                                                                                                                                                 
short of dismissal should be investigated. Various factors should be taken into account, including 
nature of the employee‘s work, the period of his disability and whether a substitute should be 
provided. In cases of permanent partial disability alternative work or diminished duties should be 
considered.  An employee may not be dismissed for ill-health or injury unless the following 
requirements have also been met: 
(i) He is given the opportunity to state his case personally or through a representative 
(ii) the cause of the disability has been investigated, for instance a work-related injury, alcoholism, 
drug abuse, depression, habitual absenteeism, - and so forth; 
(iii) the employee is incapable of doing the work; 
(is) it is not possible to adapt his duties or his work circumstances to his disability; 
(v) the degree of incapacity is severe;‘ and 
(vi) due to his disability and the circumstances mentioned above, his dismissal is justified,  
 
15
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grammatical_conjunction (accessed 20 September 2006) 
16
 The Concise Oxford Dictionary 9ed (1995) p1414 
17
 Ibid  
18
 The Concise Oxford Dictionary 9ed (1995)  p957 
19
 ―Stagger or spin around‖ The Concise Oxford Dictionary 9ed (1995) p570 
20
 ―Dizziness, a tendency to lose balance‖ The Concise Oxford Dictionary 9ed (1995) p1558 
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it to the construction put forward by Van Jaarsveld and van Eck, then there are strong 
suggestions that they intended the two words ―incapacity‖ and ―disability to be of similar 
conceptual value, that of conveying the idea that ―incapacity‖ and ―disability‖ convey the 
notion that in each case the employee has a bodily injury. And the content of the 
paragraph bears out to some extent what the heading suggests because it does not 
clearly distinguish between ―disability‖ and ―incapacity‖. It does, however, suggest to us 
to distinguish between physical, mental and intellectual forms that ―disability‖ and 
―incapacity‖ can take. For the authors the primary distinction is between mental and 
physical forms; ―incapacity‖ or ―disability‖ is conceptually the same. For them ―incapacity‖ 
and ―disability‖ are the same. The authors at no stage clearly draw out or define clearly 
the qualitative differences between ―incapacity‖ and ―disability‖ the authors, in fact, leave 
reader with the idea that ―incapacity‖ and ―disability‖ are the same thing. 
 
Also, there is a tendency to talk about disability as something that happens to the human 
body. The following phrase lends itself to this kind of conceptualization ―…where his 
disability was caused by a work-related injury or illness‖. This phrase raises the idea that 
injury or illness brings about the disability. ―His disability‖ suggests that it is present 
somewhere on his body, and was caused by particular injury or illness. For the authors 
disability is caused by an injury; that disability is the result of an injury to the body or the 
mind. The inference that can be drawn from this conceptualization is that the disability is 
the non-functioning hand or foot, or the epileptic mind. Incapacity, similarly, since it is 
used interchangeably with disability is also caused by an injury or illness to the body.  
Again, because the body has been made sick it has been rendered incapacitated and 
similarly, disabled. In considering whether the specific requirements have been met 
before an injured person can be dismissed for not being able to do their work, a 
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consideration that must be taken into account is the ―degree of severity21 of the 
incapacity‖. Again, the idea of incapacity is spoken of as synonymous with how injured 
the person‘s body is.  
 
One other aspect of their appreciation of disability and incapacity occurs when they refer 
to the procedural aspects that have to be adhered to before a dismissal can be effected. 
Van Jaarsveld and van Eck speak about ―…an employee suffering from incapacity or 
disability‖ ―suffering‖ in this context suggests that there is a body that is hurting. You are 
either mentally or physically disabled or incapacitated meaning that you are mentally 
incapacitated or mentally disabled or physically incapacitated or physically disabled. For 
the authors there is no distinction between disability and incapacity they are all the 
same. The difference for them is, whether it is physical, mental or intellectual deficiency 
that the body suffers. Their essential point of departure is the body. The sense that one 
gets is that when one speaks of disability one is speaking about incapacity and vice 
versa.  
 
To show a pattern which converges with the view adopted by text book writers van 
Jaarsveld and van Eck, the case, Tither/Trident Steel22 will be analyzed to highlight the 
fuzziness of usage when considering these two terms. The arbitrator, R Lyster, citing 
Mambalu v AECI Explosives Ltd (Zomerveld) [1995] 5 BLLR 62 (IC), had this to say: 
 
 ―It is now established law that the substantive fairness of the dismissal depends on whether the 
employer can fairly be expected to continue the employment relationship, bearing in mind the 
interests of the employee and the employer and the equities of the case. Relevant facts include 
                                                 
21
 Fanie van Jaarsveld  and Jan van Eck Principles of Labour Law; (2002) p 209 
22
 2004] 4 BALR 404 (MEIBC) 
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the nature of the incapacity, the cause of the incapacity…the effect of the employees’ disability 
…consulting with the employee about his ailment…‖ (my italics) 
 
Once more there is a pattern that does not lend itself to clear definition when speaking 
about incapacity and disability.23 This suggests that incapacity and disability are seen as 
an illness that once again suggests that the origins of incapacity and disability are of the 
body. For the arbitrator incapacity and disability are the same. 
 
When one has regard to instances of legislation that deal with access to social security 
like the Social Assistance Act No 59 of 1992, the definition of a disabled person is 
considered to be: 
 
―…any person who has attained the prescribed age and is, owing to his or her physical or mental 
disability (my italics), is unfit to obtain by virtue of any service, employment or profession the 
means needed to enable him or her to provide for his or her maintenance‖  
 
The following thoughts in respect of this definition are quite instructive:  
 
―The Social Assistance Act determines eligibility for a disability grant for persons who suffer from 
a physical and mental disability…which renders them unable to sufficiently provide for their 
maintenance. Other than linking disability with functional incapacity, these statutes are of limited 
utility in the determination of disability…The criteria that are used to determine disability 
under…the Social Security Act ultimately stresses incapacity‖
24
 
 
                                                 
23
 Illness The Concise Oxford Dictionary 9
th
 edition; Claredon Press; Oxford; 1995; p28 
24
 http://butterworths.uwc.ac.za/nxt/gateway.dll/bc/8m6r/jn6r/14as at p1 accessed 27 March 2006  
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The point is that to make for good labour law with regard to disabled people it is crucial 
that there is a clear understanding as to what disability and incapacity are. This research 
will, therefore, look at the concept of disability as understood in the social sciences, and 
American and British social science literature will be of great assistance in deepening 
the understanding of disability given the nascent nature of disability research in South 
Africa. It is also of importance that due consideration be given to various theories such 
as the medical model of disability and the social model of disability, because these 
theories could prove to be helpful in the development of the notion of disability in South 
African labour jurisprudence. It is my view that, since the Key Aspects on the 
Employment of People with Disabilities Code requires us to view disability from a social 
model of disability discourse, it is important to be able to explain why incapacity cases 
should be used with circumspection when a disability case is at issue. Thus, it has to be 
borne in mind that, to craft a progressive law relating to disabled people in the 
workplace, new interventions need to be made which would free up the limiting and 
constraining elements that are manifested in the notion of incapacity which, as explained 
above, has reduced the notion of disability to an injury to the body or the mind.  
4. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
The significance of the study is that, if labour jurisprudence is to protect disabled people, 
and give full content to the intentions of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the 
Employment Equity Act and other related legislation, it is imperative that we have a 
deeper and grounded understanding of the application of the law. It is of primary 
importance to clearly define what is meant when we speak of ‗disabled people‘ or 
‗disability‘ especially in labour law, and more specifically in this instance with regard to 
dismissal, if we are to protect the interests of disabled people.    
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5. METHODOLOGY  
The methodology employed is to undertake this research by way of literature review. 
Relevant secondary and primary sources will be used, like books, articles, case law, 
legislation and internet sources. 
6. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
Chapter 1 
Introduces and sets out the context of the research, identifies the problem, and outlines 
the methodology. 
Chapter 2 
This Chapter will deal with the construction and social origins of disability. 
Chapter 3 
This Chapter will draw on American jurisprudence as the oldest body of legal thought 
with regard to disability.   
Chapter 4  
This Chapter will draw on Canadian jurisprudence which to some extent mirrors South 
African jurisprudence. It has developed a progressive body of law on disability that could 
be of benefit to the development of the South African law on disability. 
Chapter 5 
This Chapter will locate where South African jurisprudence is presently with regard to 
disability. Cases, legislation and academic writers will be drawn on to assess the state of 
South African jurisprudence with regard to disability. 
Chapter 6 
This Chapter will be a concluding chapter which will examine the possible implications 
for South Africa‘s labour jurisprudence in respect of disabled people. 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
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CHAPTER 2: DISABILITY AND CAPITALISM 
 
The aim of this chapter will be to examine how capitalism contributes to the making of 
the concept, disability specifically focusing on questions around normality, the medical 
model of disability; social model of disability to show the systemic and structural 
influences in the construction of disability.  
 
2.1 THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS 
 
James I. Charlton was of the view that Malcolm X was wrong when he located the basis 
of oppression as lying inherently within white people. He says that by situating the basis 
of oppression exclusively in the ideas and notions of human beings, in this case white 
people, and not in systems or structures that marginalized people for political-economic 
and socio-cultural reasons Malcolm X missed the real origins of where racist ideas came 
from. Ideas do not spring from nowhere. They are not inherent in people. People are not 
born with certain ideas. Ideas do not occur naturally in people. Ideas have material 
bases from which they emerge.25  
 
Just as racist ideas are spawned from specific systems and structures, so too, do ideas 
of disability have their origins within and are drawn from the logic and imperatives of a 
particular social structure.  And implicit within these systems and structures do reside 
notions of power and domination which largely influence how social categories are 
constructed and disability is no exception.      
 
                                                 
25
 James I. Charlton ―Nothing about us without us: disability oppression and employment ‖  (2000) 
University of California Press; Berkeley p 22  
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Capitalist society as a particular type of social structure and driven by its imperatives and 
logic will naturally create its own ideas about specific social phenomena and the 
understanding of disability is but one of a myriad of other social phenomena, for example 
race, gender, age etc.   
 
Mike Oliver asserts that:  
 
―[T]he economy, through both the operation of the labour market and the social organization of 
work, plays a key role in producing the category disability and in determining societal responses 
to disabled people. Further, the oppression that disabled people face is rooted in the economic 
and social structures of capitalism which themselves produce, racism, sexism, homophobia, 
ageism and disablism‖
26
 
 
James I. Charlton underscores this fact of capitalist society when he says that:  
 
―…[F]rom these structures driven by the logic of their political and economic imperatives has 
evolved a particular kind of system which is informed by the demands of capital 
accumulation…‖
27
 
 
Michael J. Oliver agrees with James I. Charlton when he states:  
 
. . . ―that all phenomena  (including social categories) are produced by the economic and social 
forces of capitalism itself. The forms in which they are produced are ultimately dependent upon 
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their relationship to the economy … Hence, the category, disability, is produced in the particular 
form that it appears by these very economic and social forces‖.
28
    
Hence it can safely be asserted that the idea of disability in capitalist society will be 
conceptualized in accordance with the logic and imperatives of capitalist society.  
 
As the French philosopher Michel Foucault said: 
―That the way we talk about the world and the way we experience it are inextricably linked – the 
names we give to things shapes our experiences of them and our experience of things in the 
world influences the names we give to them‖
29
 
 
Disability is a product of its particular time and space. Disability in capitalist society will 
be experienced in a very particular way, not least of which, it will be tempered by issues 
of class, race, gender, power, domination, ideology and so on.  The act of naming 
disability is also an aspect of how that world has been experienced. There is an 
inextricable interplay between the experience and the crystallization of that experience 
into a particular name or label that forms a representation of that experience.  
 
These two aspects are interlinked. Each of these aspects further strengthens and 
reinforces the other; that is, the physical experience and how this experience has been 
processed as an idea and, the representation of that idea by a particular name and 
imbued with a particular meaning. 
 
Gleeson B.J confirms this when he says: 
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―[D]isability is both a socially and historically relative social relation that is conditioned by political-
economic dynamics.‖
30
  
―The primary motive force in the social construction of disability must be the material organization 
of production and reproduction‖
31
 
 
And Gleeson agrees with Mike Oliver‘s thoughts on how specific conceptualizations are 
manufactured within a specific historical time and space when he illustrates how 
impaired people were perceived in feudal society.  
 
―Feudal society did not preclude the great majority of disabled people from participating in the 
production process, and even where they could not participate fully, they were still able to make a 
contribution. In this era disabled people were regarded as individually unfortunate and not 
segregated from the rest of society‖
32
 
 
And when feudal relations of production are contrasted with capitalist relations of 
production disability has a specific meaning for these two time periods; its meaning is 
historically and socially determined; it is time bound and Gleeson agrees when he says 
that disability is seen as: 
 
―…a historically and socially specific outcome (emphasis added) of social development‖
33
 
 
Disability is a construction of a particular social organization in a specific time period 
together with the attendant political, ideological and discursive practices.  
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2.2 CAPITALIST SOCIETY 
 
The logic of capitalist society is that it is a society that is based on the right of a small 
group of people to expropriate the surplus product created by society which translates 
ultimately into a profit. And to maintain a constant production of this surplus and profit 
the efficiency of production is of paramount importance. Hence, new innovations and 
methods to revolutionize production is an on-going process to ultimately exact and 
accumulate the best possible surplus and profit. And more importantly, the people who 
produce that surplus and profit must be able to constantly and to efficiently produce it. 
They must be mentally and physically healthy to withstand the rigours and demands of 
production.  
 
Ryan and Thomas bear testimony to an aspect of capitalist production which is vital to its 
intrinsic nature which is speed, time and discipline: 34 
 
―The speed of factory work, enforced discipline, the time-keeping and production norms all these 
were a highly unfavorable change (emphasis added) from the slower, more self-determined 
methods of work into which many handicapped people had been integrated‖   
 
Hence the pursuit of profit engenders a highly competitive environment where the ability 
to work fast and efficiently is at a premium too stay ahead of the competition in the 
production of commodities for consumer needs and ultimately to make a profit.  And the 
very nature of how capitalist production is arranged and effected is not suited to disabled 
people who suffer from impairments. It thrives on speed, discipline and time which 
disabled people cannot maintain at highly industrialized levels. Hence capitalist 
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production by its very nature marginalizes and excludes disabled people. The logic of 
capitalist production is not about providing employment and jobs for people. Its intrinsic 
logic, its very nature is about surplus production and the expropriation of that surplus by 
a small dominant group in society, The real reason for employment in capitalist society is 
that workers are able to supply the essential ingredient for capitalist production and that 
is their labour power; it is about the steady supply of a labour power which is essential 
for creating surplus value and profit. 
 
Mike Oliver agrees with this view when he speaks about competition and profit being the 
foundation upon how work has been organized in modern times. He says that: 
 
―[w]ork has been organized around the twin principles of competition…and maximization of profit. 
Inevitably disabled people have suffered because of the way work has been organized around 
those two principles; inevitably we‘ve experienced exclusion from the workforce and even 
sponsored research suggests that at least seven out of ten disabled people who are of working 
age don‘t have jobs‖
35
 
 
To further illustrate this point Mike Oliver demonstrates that when production in Second 
World War was organized co-operatively and collaboratively and not for profit incidents 
of marginalization and exclusion of disabled people were at a minimum or non-existent. 
The point being made is that, even in capitalist countries where the emphasis is on co-
operation and collaboration and not solely based on profit there is a tendency for greater 
inclusion. And because of the exigencies of a world war there was greater collaboration 
and therefore greater inclusion.  
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The conclusion that can be reached, then, is that there exists a direct correlation 
between how many disabled people will be employed and how production is organized 
and under what conditions in the working environment.  
 
Hence the environment that is created which is based on specific principles of organizing 
work has a direct bearing on the employability or not of disabled people.  
 
In a work environment based on the maximization of profit and competition the chances 
are that disabled people will be unemployable. This kind of environment is not designed 
with disabled people in mind; it is designed with able-bodied people in mind who are 
able to withstand the rigours of industrial production. Capitalist society in the quest to 
accumulate surplus value and profit needs able-bodied people.  Colin Barnes succinctly 
encapsulates this when referring to capitalist production relations: 
 
―Disabled people have inhabited a cultural, political and intellectual form which whose making 
they have been excluded. . . 36   
 
2.3 NORMALCY AND CAPITALIST SOCIETY 
 
The logic of capitalist society which is based on the profit motive creates the notion that 
to be able-bodied is to be normal. And because of the pervasive and dominant discourse 
around the idea of body image it is not unusual or unthinkable for people to aspire to 
activities that will make the body conform to the demands of normality as understood in 
capitalist society.  
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Societies generally are about normality, and more specifically that particular society‘s 
normality. Hence capitalist society too, has its normality. And everybody in capitalist 
society is expected to meet the standards of this normality, the need to work faster, more 
efficiently in a bid to stay ahead of the competition, requires an able-bodied work-force. 
This is a normal and rational expectation in capitalist society. To be able-bodied is the 
standard in capitalist society. To be able-bodied is to be normal. Therefore, from the 
normal and able-bodied population will emerge the ideal worker which is expected to 
comply with the rationale and logic of capitalist relations of production. And given the 
rationale of capitalist society the ideal worker should be able-bodied. Able-bodied then 
becomes the standard or the norm by which people are judged in capitalist society. And 
if able-bodied is the norm and standard in capitalist society then capitalist society could 
be called an ablelist society; a society that promotes ideas that prefer able-bodied above 
non-able-bodied.    
 
The conclusion that can be reached is that capitalist society, ableist society and normal 
society are enmeshed; that they mutually reinforce each other. Capitalism needs able-
bodied people; it normalizes able-bodied people who are able to work efficiently and 
speedily; and at the same time it brings into play its dialectical opposite, people who are 
not able-bodied and renders them abnormal. These people are the disabled. Since they 
are disabled they do not meet the standard in capitalist society which is to be normal. To 
add weight to this observation Lennard J. Davis is of the view that the study of disability 
is the study of how capitalism normalized the body.37 Claire Liachowitz38, makes the 
point that, 
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―[m]uch of the inability to function that characterizes physically impaired people is an outcome of 
political and social decisions rather than medical limitations…an increasing number of 
sociological and psychological theorists regard disability as a complex of constraints that the 
able-bodied population imposes on the behaviour of physically impaired people‖  
 
Lennard J. Davis confirms this when he states that, 
 
―[i]n an ablelist society the normal people have constructed the world physically and cognitively to 
reward those with like abilities and handicap those with unlike abilities‖
39
 
 
The thinking then, is that, to be normal in capitalist society is to be able-bodied which 
also means not to be marginalized and excluded. It also means that not to be normal in 
capitalist society is to be disabled, marginalized and excluded. 
 
And to maintain this idea of normality a particular kind of ideology has to inform this kind 
of society and that ideology is found in the medical model of disability. 
 
2.4 MEDICAL MODEL OF DISABILITY: THE MEDICALISATION OF DISABLED 
PEOPLE 
 
The medical model of disability according to Mike Oliver saw disability ―as an individual 
problem requiring medical treatment‖40  The assumption being that: 
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―Treatment, cure and amelioration are the appropriate responses to perceived pathologies and 
social problems…to have a disability is to have something wrong with you. Disability is seen as a 
personal tragedy which occurs at random to individuals, and the problems of disability require 
individuals to adjust or come to terms with this tragedy. ‖
41
 
 
Also, for the proponents of the medical model of disability there is a complete 
disconnection between a disabled person‘s impairment and the structures of society. 
They do not see the economic, social and political structures as having anything to do 
with a disabled person. 
 
Mike Oliver concurs with this view in his criticism of the medical model adherents when 
he says: 
 
―[T]hey ignore extraneous economic, political and social factors… 42 
 
―…[T]he existing social order remains unchallenged‖43 
 
―…[I]t is taken as given the imposed segregation, passivity, and inferior status of …disabled 
people ingrained in capitalist social relations, without seriously addressing questions of 
causality‖44 
 
The general thrust of this theory was that since disabled people could not function like 
able-bodied people they could be cured medically with the express idea to be made 
normal and to be integrated into normal society as a ―normal able-bodied citizen worker‖. 
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It stressed the need to become able-bodied and normal. It also instilled in disabled 
people the desire and need to be able–bodied, this was the ideal. Hence disabled 
people were socialized and conditioned to see themselves as able-bodied. In other 
words a discourse was created around how disabled people were expected to perceive 
themselves and how capitalist society wanted them to be perceived. Capitalist society 
saw them as biological problems that could be medically cured. They, too, saw 
themselves as being medically curable.   
 
And where they could not be medically cured they would then be institutionalized where 
they would be cared for until they were medically healthy for work; and where they were 
unable to be cured while being institutionalized they would then be permanently 
institutionalized away from society.  
 
The assumptions that the medical model of disability operated from are predominantly 
premised on the idea that disability is a biological occurrence, a physical condition, an 
impairment that afflicts the individual. Disability is essentially about the body. And since 
the origins are biological in nature it can be corrected medically. Because the origins of 
disability are biological in nature they can be addressed by various medical interventions 
such as surgery, genetic screening, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, prosthetics and 
various other interventions.  
 
This kind of assumption fed into the notion that society needed to be compassionate and 
accommodating of these ―poor unfortunates‖ and that society should invest in a health 
care system with the primary objective to cure these people so that they can be 
integrated into society and take up their places as ―normal able-bodied citizen workers‖ 
ready to be productive. 
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Lennard J. Davis:  
 
―[t]he normal citizen was a necessary development for capitalism. It was the able-bodied citizen 
worker who would be endowed with qualities necessary for factory work.‖22  
 
―The standardization of height, weight, and other physical traits were part of the notion of the 
worker‖45  
 
Ultimately, the very thrust of the medical model of disability with its medical interventions 
is to enable disabled people to live ―normal‘ lives, that is, to be normalized, made able-
bodied again, and to be returned to a state of normality. 
In a paper titled ‗The Normalization Principle- Implications and Comments‘ Bengt Nirje 
confirmed the thoughts by Talcott Parsons, Safilios-Rothschild and Topliss on the 
importance of striving to being ‗normal‘ in ‗normal society‘ when he outlined his thoughts 
on the importance of being ‗normal‘ in his theory of normalization: He says that:   
―The application of the normalization principle will not "make the subnormal normal" but will make 
life conditions of the mentally subnormal normal as far as possible bearing in mind the degree of 
his handicap, his competence and maturity, as well as the need for training activities and 
availability of services. Thus aims of care and services as well as goals of training - in striving to 
develop a better adjustment to society-are also part of the normalization principle. The realistic 
appraisal of the degree of handicap, the fluctuating social conditions and demands and the 
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awareness that mostly only relative independence and integration can be attained are implied 
and stressed by the words "as close to the normal as possible"46  
When one considers Bengt Nirje‘s thoughts, a central consistently occurring theme is the 
notion of acquiring the status of normality. The whole idea of normalization is to make 
those who are ‗not normal‘ ‗normal‘. ‗Thus the aims of care and services‘ are 
mechanisms ‗‘to develop a better adjustment to society‖ To create a situation which is 
‗as close to normal as possible‘, to ‗make the subnormal normal‘. 
And Toplis is of the view that this down graded status of abnormality is an inevitability 
which flows from the tragic position that disabled people find themselves in. He says: 
―While the particular type or degree of impairment which disables a person for full participation in 
society may change, it is inevitable that there will be a line, somewhat indefinite but non the less 
real, between the able-bodied majority and a disabled minority whose interests are given salience 
in the activities of society as a whole. Similarly the values which underpin society must be those 
which support the interests and activities of the majority, hence the emphasis on vigorous and 
independence and competitive achievement, particularly in the occupational sphere, with the 
unfortunate spin-off that it encourages a stigmatizing and negative view of the disabilities which 
handicap individuals in these valued aspects of life. Because of the centrality of such values in 
the formation of citizens of the type needed to sustain the social arrangements desired by the 
able-bodied majority, they will continue to be fostered by family upbringing, education and public 
esteem. By contrast, disablement which handicaps an individual in these areas will continue to be 
negatively valued, thus tending towards the imputation of general inferiority to the disabled 
individual or stigmatization‖
47 
                                                 
46
 Bengt Nirje ―European Normalization‖ http://www.diligio.com/nirje.htm  Accessed 1 July 2008 
47
 E Topliss  (1982) Social responses to handicap. Harlow: Longman p111-112  
 
 
 
 
 33 
In the final analysis for the medical model proponents of disability it is about a physical 
or mental impairment, it has nothing to do with society.  
 
The inference that can be drawn is that the disabled individual has to conform to the 
demands, imperatives and logic of capitalist/ableist society. 
 
There is also a realization that those who are not considered to be ‗normal‘ ‗that mostly 
only relative independence and integration can be attained‘, here, there is a sense that 
there can only be a marginal level of integration for those who do not fit into the category 
of ‗normal‘. There is a sense that these individuals will have to reside on the margins of 
‗normal society‘ which Topliss considers as an inevitability, relegated to second class 
citizens waiting to be cared for by the charity of society. 
 
2.5 SOCIAL MODEL THEORISTS 
 
Social model theorists of disability like Mike Oliver, Colin Barnes and Len Barton are 
sociologists from a Marxist tradition and their analysis of social relations in society is 
based on a critique of capitalist society and its role in marginalizing disabled people.  
They employ an emancipatory sociology which they believe is able to ask the questions 
that will go to the essence of disabled people‘s problems in capitalist society.  
 
Len Barton‘s view with regard to the role that sociologists should play is instructive: 
―A questioning approach to social reality is . . . based upon a conviction that existing social 
arrangements are neither natural nor proper and are therefore subject to critique and change‖48 
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―That their tasks are to make connections between structural conditions and the lived reality of 
people in particular social settings‖49 
 
―Asking questions…sharpening the focus of concern…and providing critiques of existing forms of 
social conditions and relations‖
50
 
 
He continues in this critical vein by stating: 
 
―Part of the sociological imagination involves a healthy skepticism and desire to get beneath the 
surface features to the deep structures of social relations and experience‖ 51 
 
And to drive home his point, he says: 
 
―What is important sociologically in relation to disability is that we recognize the profundity of the 
struggle which is concerned with the realization of a barrier-free society‖. 
 
The social model theorists are of the view that critique and change are the paths to 
understanding the role that capitalist society plays with regard to the marginalization of 
disabled people. It is a social theory that is steeped in the ideas of challenging and 
changing restricting and inhibiting structures of society that hold in thrall a section of 
humanity just because they do not comply with the imperatives of the dominant 
discourses that hold sway in capitalist society namely, discourses based on oppression, 
marginalization, peripherilization and normalization.  
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The Social Model theory of disability is a critical tool which is able to ask questions which 
could peel away the layers of the all- prevailing, ubiquitous medical model discourse that 
keeps disabled people in a state of marginalization. It is also a social theory which seeks 
to demonstrate how the social construction of social categories such as race, gender, 
class and disability are primarily shaped by economics, politics, ideology and discursive 
practices.  
 
In his criticism of Goffman‘s thoughts on the stigmatization of impaired people Mike 
Oliver raises a key aspect which is lost on Goffman‘s interactionist approach and which 
is crucial to the construction of disability which reduced relations between disabled and 
able-bodied people to a matter of stigmatization,52 is the notion of causality.  According 
to Oliver what is of primary significance for Goffman is the interaction between normal 
able-bodied individuals and abnormal disabled individuals; that is, how able-bodied 
people perceived disabled people. The social interaction between disabled and able-
bodied is of importance to Goffman, the perceptions that able-bodied has of disabled, 
and not, how these two categories are constructed within the context of a particular 
historical moment and in this case, capitalist society. The root cause of how these social 
categories are socially constituted do not form part of Goffman‘s appreciation of the 
coming into existence of these categories. He takes these categories as given, as 
naturally occurring, and as having been there for all time and, more importantly, seeing 
their material context as not causally linked to their marginalization and stigmatization.  
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―Goffman‘s use of the term stigma is based on perceptions of the oppressor rather than those of 
the oppressed…the issue of stigma is an issue of exploitation and oppression…and in the 
modern context he fails to move beyond the individual . . .  he takes as given the imposed 
passivity and inferior status of stigmatized individuals and groups –including disabled people-
ingrained in capitalist society, without seriously addressing questions of causality‖53  
 
Having laid the basis by investigating some key aspects which drives the social model 
project, what are the basic tenets of this model? In 1976 the Union of the Physically 
Impaired Against Segregation came to an understanding of disability.  They concluded 
that disability was a form of social oppression. In their own words: 
 
―In our view, it is society which disables physically impaired people. Disability is something 
imposed on top of our impairments by the way we are unnecessarily isolated and excluded from 
full participation in society.  Disabled people are therefore an oppressed group in society. To 
understand this it is necessary to grasp the distinction between the physical impairment and the 
social situation, called ‗disability‘, of people with such impairment. Thus we define impairment as 
lacking part of or all of a limb, or having a defective limb, organ or mechanism of the body; and 
disability as the disadvantage or restriction of activity caused by a contemporary social 
organization which takes no or little account of people who have physical impairments and thus 
excludes them from participation in the mainstream of social activities. Physical disability is 
therefore a particular form of social oppression‖
54   
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It is good and well for UPIAS to show a distinction between impairment and disability 
and that impairment is about the body and that disability is about society. The question 
to ask is, how, is this explanation arrived at.  
 
The present author will rely heavily on an account based on materialism by B.J. Gleeson 
a researcher from the Australian National University in Canberra to explain the 
impairment/disability dichotomy. 
 
Gleeson starts by stating that all social relations are products of the practices that 
humans pursue in meeting their basic needs for food, shelter etc. The social practices of 
each community are seen as transforming the basic materials-both physical and 
biological-received from previous societies. These basic, historically-received materials 
are known to materialism as ‗first nature‘ and include everything from the built 
environment to the bodies social actors receive from previous generations. When these 
materials are then taken and remade by a succeeding society they become known as 
‗second nature‘ 55  
 
From materialism emerges a distinctive conception of disability which parallels this twin 
conception of first and second nature. This Gleeson attributes to the efforts of Abberley, 
Finkelstein and Oliver where they make an important distinction between impairment, 
which refers to the absence of a limb, or having a defective limb, organism or 
mechanism of the body, and disability, which is the socially imposed state of exclusion or 
constraint that physically impaired individuals may be forced to endure56. 
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From this, disability is defined as social oppression which any society might produce in 
the transformation of first nature-the bodies and materials received from social 
formations57. 
 
The critical point says Gleeson, is that the social construction of physically impaired 
people as disabled people arises, in the first instance, from the specific ways in which 
society organizes its basic material activities. (work, transport, leisure, domestic 
activities).  
 
Attitudes, discourses, and symbolic representations are, of course, critical to the 
reproduction of disablement, but are themselves the product of the social practices 
which society undertakes in order to meet its basic material needs. 
 
Important is the assumption that impairment is simply an altered state, characterized by 
absence or altered physiology, which define the physicality of certain people. No a priori 
(prior) assumption is made about the social meaning or significance of impairment that 
is, how impairment is perceived and given meaning to within its social context. 
Impairment can only be understood concretely-viz. historically and culturally-through its 
socialization as disability. 
 
This is not to say that the materialist position ignores the real limits which nature, 
through impairment, places upon individuals. Rather, materialists seek to separate, both 
ontologically58 and politically, the oppressive social experience of disability from the 
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unique functional limitations (and capacities) which impairment can pose for 
individuals.59  
 
Impairment is a form of first nature which certainly embodies a given set of limitations 
and abilities which then places real and ineluctable conditions on the social capacities of 
certain individuals.60 
 
However, the social capacities of impaired individuals can never be defined as a set of 
knowable and historically fixed ‗functional limitations‘. The capacities are conditioned 
both culturally and historically and must therefore be defined through concrete spatio-
temporal analyses.61 
 
Far from being a natural human experience, disability is what may become of 
impairment as each society produces itself socio-spatially: there is no necessary 
correspondence between impairment and disability. There are only historical geographic 
correspondences which obtain when some societies, in the course of producing and 
reproducing themselves, oppressively transform impaired into disablement. Gleeson 
goes on by stating and this is crucial that: 
 
―[T]here is an established tendency for disability analysts to reduce disability to impairment: the 
ahistorical and aspatial assumption that nature dictates the social delimitation of disability‖
62
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Against this, materialism recognizes that different societies may produce environments 
which liberate the capacities of impaired people whilst not aggravating their limitations.63 
 
It is certainly possible to point to historical societies where impairment was socio-
spatially reproduced in far less disabling ways than has been the case in capitalism.64 
 
Gleeson attributes the non-disabling character of feudal English society both to a 
confined realm of physical interaction and, more importantly, to the relative weak 
presence of commodity production. He argues that the growth of commodity relations in 
late feudal England slowly eroded the labour-power of impaired people.65 
 
Market relations and the commodification of labour introduced a social evaluation of 
work (the law of value) into peasant households which were relatively autonomous 
production units.66 
 
The increasing social authority of the law of value meant that peasant households were 
increasingly subjected to an external force called the market which assessed the worth 
of labour by average productivity standards.67  
 
This new way of approaching and evaluating the productivity of individual labour power 
meant that ‗slower‘ ‗weaker‘ individuals were devalued in terms of their potential for paid 
work.68 
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For impaired workers this had a negative impact upon their ability to find work which was 
not subject to these new ways of working which were essentially driven by the demands 
of the market and commodification.  
 
Together with these new arrangements sites of production were themselves evolving 
and were recreating social spaces which were compelled by the logic of competition to 
seek the most productive forms of labour–power. And not only was there a pursuit of the 
―most productive forms of labour-power‖  but the harnessing of this form of labour could 
not be done within the confines of the home as was the case in the feudal mode of 
production. There had to be a separation of home and work to best exact the optimum 
productive power from the ‗most productive forms of labour – power. This disjuncture of 
work and home in the pursuit of harnessing the ―most productive forms of labour power‖ 
inevitably drove a wedge between the ―most productive forms of labour-power‖ and 
those not ―so productive forms of labour –power‖ viz impaired people.  
 
In the words of Gleeson: 
 
―[I]ndustrial work places were structured and used in ways which disabled ‗uncompetitive‘ 
workers, including …impaired workers. The rise of mechanized forms of production introduced 
productivity standards which assumed a ‗normal‘ (viz male and non-impaired) worker‘s body and 
disabled all others‖
69
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To sum up Gleeson states: 
 
―For impaired people then, the social history of capitalism appears as a socio-spatial dialectic of 
commodification and spatial change which progressively disabled their labour-power‖
70
 
 
And to further his point he warns: 
 
―The discriminatory design of work places …often appears to disabled people as the immediate 
source of their economic exclusion. However, this is true in only a very immediate sense. The real 
source of economic devaluation is the set of socio-structural forces that condition the production 
of disabling workplaces. The commodity labour market is …clearly implicated in the construction 
of disabling employment environments. This market realm, through the principle of employment 
competition, ensures that certain individuals (or bodies) will be rewarded and socially-enabled by 
paid labour, whilst others are economically devalued and sentenced to social dependency, or 
worse‖
71
   
 
The point of Gleeson‘s analysis is that he demonstrates how the socio/economic 
structure of capitalist society has a direct bearing on the ontological transcendence from 
one state of being to another. He clearly shows how impaired moves to disabled simply 
because there is an organizational change from one type of social organization to 
another. Impaired people were impaired in feudal society but they became disabled in 
capitalist society. His argument is that disability is a uniquely capitalist moment. It is a 
spatial/temporal happening inimically capitalist in orientation. Competitive work relations 
amongst workers to meet the standards of the ‗normal‘ worker which is productive; the 
harnessing of this worker into a factory to ensure that this kind of productivity was away 
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from the home where it usually took place in feudal society are some of the elements 
which are crucial to the ensuring of capitalist relations of production are anathema to 
people who are impaired and so are disabled, since they do not measure up to the 
standard of the ‗normal‘ worker in capitalist society. 
 
However, a purely structuralist appreciation of the making of disability is not the entire 
story, theorists such as Tom Shakespseare have argued that beliefs, symbols, idelology, 
culture, language, texts and discursive practices all play a role in the disabling of 
impaired people. Culture in all its ramifications in capitalist society plays a crucial role in 
maintaining the being of disabled, just as it does in maintaining racism, sexism, 
homophobia etc. Culture is premised upon the capitalist economic structure but it is also 
crucial in maintaining these social relations in all its guises as a way of inducing consent 
from those who are marginalized to accept the existing social relations and it attendant 
power relations.      
 
Hence, writers like Tom Shakespeare, Mike Oliver and Mairian Corker correctly aver that 
to deepen the understanding of the making of disability there is a need to look at the 
ideological, cultural and discursive practices at play which assist in the keeping of the 
capitalist social structure in place and not to rely exclusively on an analysis of the social 
structure as the only aspect in the construction of disability. 
 
Tom Shakespeare explains: 
―[P]eople with impairments are not simply disabled by material discrimination but also by 
prejudice‖ 
72
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He qualifies this prejudice: 
 
―[T]his prejudice is implicit in cultural representation, in language, and in socialization‖73 
 
And he explains this prejudice as the ‗othering‘74 of disabled people; the objectification of 
disabled people.75 
 
Colin Barnes says of Mike Oliver in his analysis of the implications that capitalism had 
for disabled people which supports Tom Shakespeare‘s stance: 
 
―Oliver provides a materialist account of the creation of disability which places ideology – a set of 
values and beliefs underpinning social practices – or culture at the centre of the analysis‖
76
 
 
Following on this Colin Barnes says: 
 
―[I]mpairment cannot be explained simply with reference to single factors such as the economy, 
belief systems or cultural relativism. They are culturally produced through the complex interaction 
between ‗the mode of production and the central values of the society concerned‖ 
77
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And to add: 
 
―Today, the importance and desirability of bodily perfection are endemic to western society. In 
terms of the oppression of disabled people, it finds expression in . . . the proliferation of ‗able-
bodied‘ values and the misrepresentation of disabled people in all forms of the communication of 
media. Moreover, it is only within the last decade or so that this cultural or ideological hegemony 
has been seriously challenged‖
78
 
 
And to conclude: 
 
―It is evident that the cultural oppression of people with impairments can be traced back to the 
very foundations of western society. At its core lies the myth of bodily and intellectual perfection 
or ‗able-bodied ideal…there can be little doubt that it exercises a considerable influence on the 
lived experience of disabled people…It is clear, however, that this phenomenon can be explained 
with reference to material and cultural forces…and…prejudice, in whatever form it takes is not an 
inevitable consequence of the human condition, it is the product of a particular from of social 
development associated with western capitalism…and …to eliminate prejudice…in addition to 
economic and political initiatives this must include the construction of a culture that 
acknowledges, accommodates and celebrates human difference, whatever its causes rather than 
to oppress it‖
79
  
 
Having shown how capitalism creates the social category ‗disabled‘ the next important 
step in this analysis is the importance and necessity to deepen the understanding of 
disability with other tools of analysis. The question that needs to be addressed is; how 
does capitalism maintain and reproduce this social category of ‗the disabled‘? It will be 
contended that for capitalism to reproduce this social category it relies on tools such as 
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culture, language, ideology and discourse. And, likewise to peel away or to peer behind 
this cultural, linguistic, ideological, discursive veil of oppression that enthralls disabled 
people discourse analysis will be employed as the instrument of choice in chapter three.  
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CHAPTER 3: DISCOURSE AND IDEOLOGY: THE CONSTRUCTION OF DISABILITY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The objective of this chapter is primarily to posit an understanding of disability which 
seeks to challenge and rethink how disability is presently thought about. It is an 
approach which endeavors to demonstrate that there is nothing essential or natural 
about disability; that disability is not a naturally occurring social category. Rather, it is 
socially constructed by human beings under very specific historical conditions and for 
very specific reasons.  
 
The historical conditions within which disability occurs are constructed within 
environments where a myriad of power relations are at play. Within this array of power 
relations there usually is a set of dominant power relations informed by its ideological 
imperatives and are sustained and reproduced discursively.  These dominant power 
relations to a large extent, also, have a bearing on how social categories are constituted 
and maintained given the dynamic, logic and imperatives of the social structure wherein 
these power relations are located.    
 
To go behind this constructed veil of disability and to deepen the understanding of 
disability the works of Norman Fairclough, Collette Guillaumin ; Peter Leonard; Tom 
Shakespeare will all be considered to draw out a deeper appreciation of how disability is 
constructed, constituted and ultimately sustained in capitalist society. 
 
And by way of introduction a quote from Mike Oliver about the notion of discourse: 
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―[D]iscourse is about the interplay between language and social relationships, in which 
some groups are able to achieve dominance for their interests in the way in which the 
world is defined and acted upon. Such groups include not only dominant economic 
classes, but also men within patriarchy, and white people within the racism of colonial 
and post-colonial societies, as well as professionals in relation to service users. 
Language is a central aspect of discourse through which power is reproduced and 
communicated‖ 80 
 
Colin Barnes according to Mairian Corker is of the view that: 
―[D]isability is ‗socially created‘ ‗located in the social and economic structure and culture 
of the society in which it is found‖81 
 
Tom Shakespeare expands on this theme: 
 
―I do not …intend to abandon the social model‘s stress on material, environmental and 
policy factors. But rather than reducing the category ‗disability‘ to straightforward social 
relation, I think an analysis of discursive practices offers a richer and complex picture of 
disability. It is in this sense…that I would say disability is socially constructed …‖82  
 
So far a notion of discourse has been posited; the centrality of language and the role 
that is plays in discourse as a guarantor of certain power relations has been identified; 
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also the idea that a materialist account does not give a full ‗rich complex‘ picture of 
disability; also the idea that disability as a ‗socially created‘ socially constructed category 
has been brought to the fore; an aspect that also needs to be raised is the idea that 
‗disability‘ is not an essential, biological and naturally occurring social category, a reified 
for all time category, it is not a constant, static category; rather, it is a dynamic constantly 
changing category.  
Judith Butler agrees when she shows how a social category is constituted by the 
dynamism of discourse:  
 
―[T]he subject is discursively constituted…as fictions that are neither fixed nor stable‖
83
 
 
Bill Hughes agrees with Judith Butler with regard to the discursive constitution of the 
body: 
 
―[T]he impaired body is a historically contingent product of power and…not a set of universal 
biological characteristics amenable to and objectively defined by diagnostic practices as the 
medical profession would have it…[T]he body is produced by meaning and interpretation and is 
therefore best understood in terms of discourse or cultural representation‖ 
84
   
 
And he further explains the point:  
 
―Perhaps the best way to this ‗anti-essentialist argument is… to think about non-disabled bodies. 
The non-disabled body is usually described as ‗normal‘. But what do we mean by ‗normal‘? 
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Clearly it is not a precise term, more of a statistical average. In other words, in reality, the normal 
or non-disabled body does not exist. What does exist is the linguistic convention or discourse of 
normality that conveys something to us about bodies and helps us to make sense of them. If the 
non-disabled body does not exist in any essential sense, then, the same applies to the disabled 
body. It is a metaphor, a cultural representation. 
85
      
 
It is a perception of the body in a particular state namely, impairment, that is socially 
constructed within the confines of a specific spatial/temporal context as disability; and 
the social construction of impaired people in the spatial/temporality of capitalist society 
manifests itself as disability.  
 
Peter Leonard in his exposition on the concept of the ‗subject‘86 echoes these thoughts 
when he says that: 
―No contemporary social or political theorist would argue that the individual is free of social 
constraints, from the effects of the social, economic and wider cultural context‖
87
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Following from this it could be argued that impairment could in all probability manifest 
itself as some or other category other than disability should the organization of society 
change. 
 
If the impaired body is socially constructed; a historically contingent product of power; 
how is it constructed? Collette Guillaumin and Christine Overall have interesting insights 
as to how this is achieved. Collette Guillaumin‘s account on the idea of race as a 
naturally occurring category highlights certain significant insights which will be drawn 
upon and which could prove helpful in appreciating the understanding of disability from 
another dimension.   
 
The dimension alluded to is whether disability is natural and Christine Overall is of the 
view that for social categories to be of nature it must exist outside of human agency. And 
any social category that has been constructed by human intervention is a social 
construction and therefore not natural. 
In referring to the social construction of identities such as gender, race and disability 
Christine Overall has this to say:  
 
―To regard these identities as socially constructed is to say, first, that they are not ―natural‖; that 
is, they are not entities that exist in ―nature‖ independent of human agency‖
88
 
 
She further draws on the work of Simone de Beauvoir to drive home the point by saying: 
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―One is not born, let alone conceived a woman, an Aboriginal, disabled person, or an elderly 
person, but rather becomes a woman, and Aboriginal, a disabled person, or an elderly person…to 
regard these identities as socially constructed is to say that they are created, reinforced and 
sustained, although not necessarily with intention or full consciousness, through normative 
conventions, relations and practices.
89
 
 
To summarize, Christine Overall is of the view that race, age, disability are not naturally 
occurring categories. These are all socially constructed categories because they have 
been created by human intervention; human agency; these categories are the makings 
of human intervention. They are created, reinforced and sustained by human 
intervention.  
 
The question then is how does this intervention actually facilitate the construction of 
these categories?  
 
In her exposition on socially constructing impairment Christine Overall raises the 
question of signification. She says that the term ―impairment‖ is given a definition by 
picking out certain states of physical features-limbs, organs, and systems-and attributing 
significance to them as fundamentally defining particular individuals and groups of 
individuals as abnormal or defective in ways that are believed to be ―biological‖. In this 
sense impairment too, could also be redefined or expanded, by picking out new arrays of 
features thought to be abnormal or defective.90  
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Robert Miles in his writings on ‗race‘ construction also employs the notion of 
signification. And to echo and amplify Christine Overall‘s thoughts Robert Miles sees 
signification as the ―central moment in the process of representation‖91 
 
What does he mean by this? He says it is the process of depicting the social world and 
social processes, of creating a sense of how things ‗really are‘.92 
 
He further elaborates by saying that the representational process turns on the notion of 
signification. How then does signification bring into being the representational process? 
He states that the process of signification comes about where meanings are attributed to 
particular features, objects and processes in such a way that they are given special 
significance. Signification therefore involves selection from an available range of objects, 
features or projects, and certain ones are chosen to convey additional meaning. The 
object, feature or process treated in this way thereby becomes a sign of the existence of 
some hypothesized or real phenomena.93   
 
The point being made is that there are no constant for-all-time social categories, social 
categories are socially and culturally bounded and circumscribed by what that particular 
society or social context wants it to mean. The process of signification that Robert Miles 
employs to explain and which is pivotal to the process of representation, more or less 
effects the same action which Christine Overall employs in bounding a particular social 
category, which is the role that human intervention or human agency plays in the 
circumscribing of a particular social category. It is a group of people who with the 
requisite power has the capacity to effect the process of signification which brings about 
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the notion of representation. And for Robert Miles the selection of a particular somatic 
characteristic in the constructing of ‗race‘ namely skin colour, and giving it meaning 
whether valued or devalued, and in the case of ‗race‘ valued being equated with white 
and devalued with black  is an act of human agency. It is human intervention which 
brings into being the process of signification which is the process of setting aside a 
group of people based on a shared characteristic and then making that shared 
characteristic the defining attribute of that particular group. The shared characteristic 
then represents that group. So, where a group of people have been signified as having a 
physical or mental impairment the signified shared attribute, the impaired body or mind, 
becomes the symbol that represents that particular social grouping, meaning is then 
attributed which is either devalued or valued. And in capitalist society people who have 
impairments are most times devalued because they cannot perform as able-bodied 
people in the creation of surplus value. They are perceived to be not as productive as 
able-bodied people.  
 
3.2 THE „MARK‟: CONSTRUCTING DISABILITY AS A „NATURAL GROUP‟ 
 
Collette Guillaumin raises some key factors around the understanding of the ―mark‖ 
which could further be useful in the understanding of the construction of disability as a 
―natural group‖.  Guillaumin in her thoughts on the social construction of social 
categories raises the idea of the ―mark‖ and the very unnaturalness of the ―natural 
group‖. She also demonstrates how the understanding of the ―mark‖ leads to the 
creation of the very unnatural ―natural group‖.  Firstly, she states that the characteristics 
of the ―mark‖ vary in terms of the permanence of the mark in relation to the body. The 
permanence of the mark in relation to the body suggests the degree of subjection that 
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the body is subjected to. It is a sign of the permanence of the power relationship 
between the marker and the marked.  
 
The dominating group imposes its fixed inscription on those who are materially subjected 
to them. Drawing on this exposition and taking into consideration the relation between 
able-bodied and disabled an argument could be made that the broken limb or non -
functioning mind could be construed as the ―mark‖ in relation to the body which is 
imposed upon by the able-bodied to establish a power relation between able –bodied  
and disabled person. And since the impaired body where it cannot be fixed or repaired, 
the non-functioning limb or mind is symbolic of the permanence of the power relations 
that exist between able-bodied and impaired person. The non-functioning limb or mind 
then becomes an expression of the social station of an impaired person; it also connotes 
the permanence of this relationship where the impaired body cannot be fixed to satisfy 
the requirements of normality in capitalist society. And over time this continued practice 
moves from that of being inherently and intrinsically part of that social category to that of 
being symbolic. It becomes natural. Whenever a person appears to be physically or 
mentally dysfunctional because they have been so ―marked‖ it is naturally assumed that 
these specific social actors have a particular station in society which emits from the idea 
that they have to be cared for, cured and rehabilitated. It is also naturally assumed that 
these specific social actors are permanently locked into this particular social relation 
purely on the basis that they cannot return to normal society as the ideal worker/citizen. 
They have been ―marked‖.      
 
The natural mark has been presumed to be the intrinsic cause of the place that a group 
occupies in social relationships; it is the origin of these relationships; it is supposed to be 
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the internal, therefore the natural ‗capacities‘ that determine social facts. In the words of 
Collette Guillaumin: 
 
―The modern idea of a natural group is the fluid synthesis of two systems: the traditional system 
of the mark purely functional…which is no different from marking live stock and a system which 
sees in any object whatever a substance which secretes its own causes, which is in itself its own 
causes. What interests us here is the social group, and its practices which are supposed to be the 
product of its specific nature(my emphasis).‖
94
 
 
The idea of the natural group has its origins in the idea of the natural mark. When the 
impairment of the disabled person is considered the whole identity of the impaired 
person is distilled into the idea of the impairment. The impairment being the broken body 
or the broken mind, this biological particularity, symbolizes that which is impaired. In fact 
the broken body is transformed into an idea a representation of the physicality of the 
broken body, the broken body has been signified it has been given a specific 
significance. It has been given a particular meaning. The impaired person‘s broken body 
has become intrinsic to his/her whole existence. It is the core of the impaired person‘s 
existence. It is the impaired person‘s existence. It is what makes him/her relevant or 
irrelevant. It is what gives them meaning. They represent something although devalued. 
They stand in relation to others in a particular way. It is the very origin of how social 
relationships are formed with others in society. The broken body has been internalized 
and reconstituted as a notion of nature. The broken body is its own cause for its 
existence in the social context that it finds itself in. And that which it does or does not do 
emanates from its specific intrinsic nature, the physical mark, the natural mark of the 
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broken body. However, whatever this broken body does or does not do emits from its 
natural state, which is the broken body.    
 
And it is on this basis that able-bodied people engage or relate to disabled people. And it 
is on this basis that able-bodied people in capitalist society disable impaired people, on 
the basis of its ―natural state‖, the broken body. This usually becomes a social relation of 
domination simply because disabled people are not suited for capitalist society. They 
cannot comply with the demands and rigours of capitalist society; capitalist society is 
also not prepared to change in a fundamental way at a structural level and at a 
discursive level to appreciate the ontological peculiarities of disabled people. They are 
not the normal citizen worker who can respond to the demands of capitalist society. 
They do not fit into the mould and expectations of the ‗normal citizen worker‘. In short, 
they are not productive, that is, they are not able to produce a surplus at a sustained 
level which is essential for the survival of capitalist society.  And it is so because the very 
―nature‖ of the disabled person disqualifies them. The intrinsic essence of the disabled 
person disqualifies them. And what may that intrinsic essence be? It is none other than 
the broken body or broken mind. It is therefore very ―natural‖ for disabled people to be 
unproductive and for that matter unemployable; it is in their ‗nature‘.    
Collette Guillaumin further expounds on how ―nature‖ gives disability its permanency 
when she says: 
 
―‗Nature‘ proclaims the permanence of the effects of certain social relations on 
dominated groups. Not the perpetuation of these social relations themselves but the 
permanence of the effects‖ 95 
 
                                                 
95
 Ibid p143 
 
 
 
 
 58 
Guillaumin is arguing that the whole idea of ―nature‖ is not one that looks at the social 
relation under-girded by power that is brought into existence by the ―marking‖ of disabled 
people and their subsequent marginalization and domination, it rather focuses on the 
effects, the practical outcomes of the relationship, what a disable person can or cannot 
do, this is important for the whole idea of ―nature‖. Its primary role is to mask the true 
nature of the relationship between able-bodied and disabled, namely, one of domination. 
Rather its emphasis is on the ―nature‖ of disabled people and as argued above this 
―nature‖ is informed by the broken body or broken mind which is intrinsic to disabled 
people and what flows from this intrinsicness is that disabled people are not productive 
as would the demands of capitalist society would want. 
 
Guillaumin says: 
 
―To speak of a natural specificity of social groups is to say in sophisticated way that a particular 
―nature‖ is directly productive of a social practice and to by pass the social relationship that this 
practice brings into being‖ 
96
 
 
It is natural for the disabled to be unproductive and unemployable. Their inability which 
leads to their un-productivity which leads to their un-employability is a direct result of the 
social relation between able-bodied and disabled and this  flows from the logic of 
capitalist society. Disabled people are seen as unproductive in the capitalist sense 
simply because the structures of capitalist society which are constructed on the 
underlying logic of profit which is fueled by competing with rival capitalists to stay ahead 
of the competition is unable to accommodate disabled people. Disabled people are not 
able to stand up to the rigors of the demands of capital accumulation where speed is at a 
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premium if a capitalist enterprise is to stay ahead of the competition. In short capitalist 
society is not designed for disabled people. And it is by the very nature of capitalist 
society that specific social relations are brought into existence. In this case it clearly 
draws stark contradictions between able – bodied, productive and employable; and 
disabled, unproductive and un-employable. And since this contradiction is perpetuated 
the social relation is also perpetuated; and since the social relation is perpetuated the 
practice is perpetuated and over time a perception is created from the social practice 
and this takes on a mental construct which suggests that this is a natural occurrence, it 
is for all time. It therefore becomes a case of this is what the disabled do or do not do it 
is in their nature to do or not to do certain things therefore it is natural to disabled people, 
they have been doing this for time immemorial.  
 
Guillaumin goes on further to say and which is crucial to understanding the reason 
behind the idea of the ideology of the ―natural group‖: 
 
―The idea of the nature of the groups concerned precludes recognition of the real relationship by 
concentrating attention first on isolated, fragmented traits, presumed to be intrinsic and 
permanent which are supposed to be the direct causes of practices …It is thus that slavery 
becomes an attribute of skin colour, that non-payment for domestic work becomes an attribute of 
the shape of sexual organs…‖
97
  
 
Guillaumin rightly states that the idea of the ―nature of groups‖ is precisely to hide the 
true relationship between dominated and dominant groups which is fundamentally about 
hiding the power relations.  
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Rather, the focus is directed at the supposed ‗intrinsic nature‘ of the dominated group 
and to show that it is by their intrinsic nature that they occupy a certain position in 
society. These traits are connected to a naturalist affirmation whose contradictions, 
logical silences and affirmations demonstrate dubiousness and ambiguity. And the 
imaginary character of a term of the connection is invisible-thanks to Nature‖98 
 
And to conclude, she says: 
 
―The idea of the somatic-physiological internal specificity of the social group concerned 
is an imaginary formulation (in the sense that naturalness exists in the mind) associated 
to a social relationship. This relationship is identifiable through the criteria noted (broken 
body/mind), which are completely material, technological and economic‖.99 
 
The ideological implications of ―nature‖ and of natural groups cannot be passed over 
says Guillaumin and therefore it occupies a central place in all social relations. 
Ideologically hidden, the natural form, whether it is common knowledge or already 
institutionalized, it is at the centre of the technical means used by the relationships of 
domination and power to impose themselves on dominated groups, and to go on using 
them.100 
 
To conclude, the invention of the idea of the ―natural group‖ cannot be separated from 
domination and the appropriation of human beings. It unfolded in this precise 
relationship. But appropriation which treats human beings as things and from that draws 
ideological variations, is not enough in itself to lead to the modern understanding of 
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natural groups. And the element that crucially constitutes the modern understanding of 
natural group is the whole idea of a factor that is internal to the object in question. Also, if 
what is expressed by the term ‗natural‘ is the pure materiality of the implicated objects 
then the objects in question are no natural than the relationships that constituted them. 
And these relationships are by no means natural since they do not exist outside of 
human intervention. And this coincides with the views of Christine Overall when she 
speaks about the fixity of impairment as a biological entity for she concludes that 
impairment is also a socially constructed entity it is not naturally occurring and by this 
she means that:  
 
―For the so-called biological substratum…is itself, socially constructed. It is not a natural 
entity, pre-existing human intervention, and, possessing an existence independent of 
human intervention. Instead the so-called biological substratum is itself a product of 
social construction; that is, it is created, reinforced, and sustained…through human 
relations and practice‖101    
 
These relationships are precisely because of human intervention; and this intervention is 
essentially about power. And Guillaumin says that these very relationships ―make them, 
since they only exist as things within these relationships”.102  Therefore impaired people 
exist as disabled because they have been constituted by a relationship of disability 
which is constituted and constructed by the able-bodied and is based on power. She 
further states: 
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―Outside of these they do not exist; they cannot even be imagined. They are not givens 
of nature, but naturalized givens of social relationships‖103  
 
3.3 THE NARRATIVE 
 
 John B. Thompson‘s ideas on ―the narrative‖ as a tool to give a particular social practice 
an air of eternity and ―for all time‖ is an apt device, in this case, to give the idea that the 
category of the disabled is a naturally occurring social category. He shows how ―the 
narrative‖ (the telling of stories) as a device, is used to legitimate ideology‘s attempts at 
sustaining and justifying relations of domination over a period of time; to give it an aura 
of timeless acceptance.  He says: 
 
―For ideology, in so far as it seeks to sustain relations of domination by representing them as 
‗legitimate‘, tends to assume a narrative form. Stories are told which justify the exercise of power 
by those who possess it, situating these individuals within a tissue of tales that recapitulate the 
past and anticipate the future‖
104
 
 
The notion of the ‗narrative‘ is a powerful device to cement the idea of the permanence 
of the ‗natural group‘. It gives the idea of the ‗natural group‘ the quality of timelessness 
that ‗natural groups‘ have evolved over a period of time and that human intervention had 
no hand in its creation. 
  
Having discussed the ‗naturalization of social groups and also raised the issue around 
the construction of a sense of timelessness by employing the idea of the narrative, one 
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other crucial aspect that needs to be discussed is to show the centrality of language in 
the perpetuation and reproduction of the idea of the ―natural group‖.   
 
3.4 LANGUAGE AND DISCOURSE IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF DISABILITY. 
 
Mike Oliver states that often people assume that language is about communication.105  
 
Vivien Burr agrees with Mike Oliver when she says that traditionally and in a common 
sense way people see language as a means of expressing that which they are 
experiencing in the world and how they experience themselves‘. Language is generally 
seen as a vehicle or instrument to convey certain feelings and to describe the world as it 
is experienced daily.  
She says: 
 
―People use language to give expression to things that already exist in ‗themselves‘ or in the 
world…the relationship between language and the person sees the one as a means of 
expressing the other‖
106
 
 
She continues and adds: 
 
―When people talk about ‗myself‘, their ‗personality‘ or some aspect of their experience, it 
is assumed that that this ‗self‘ or ‗personality‘ or experience predates and exists 
independently of the words used to describe it… We think of language as a bag of labels 
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which we can choose from in trying to describe our internal states (thoughts, feelings 
etc)‖107 
 
This is not so says Vivien Burr and makes the point that: 
 
―‘Language is not transparent‘ i.e. we should guard against the common sense assumption that 
language is nothing more than a clear, pure medium through which our thoughts and feelings can 
be made available to others, rather like a good telephone line or window which has no 
irregularities in the glass to distort our view‖
108
 
 
Norman Fairclough also speaks about the ―transparency of language‖ which in actual 
fact hides its true meaning and intentions which are usually ideologically loaded and 
used in the pursuit of a particular set of interests under the appearance of being ―just 
naturally, commonsensically ‗there‘‖109 
 
This understanding of language is not how language is supposed to be understood. It is 
too simplistic and does not posit the idea of language as a part of discourse. As Mike 
Oliver alludes: 
 
―Language cannot be understood merely as a symbolic system or code but as a discourse, or 
more properly as a series of discourses‖ 
110
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And Norman Fairclough agrees with Mike Oliver when he states that:  
 
―…[T]he conception of language that we need is that of discourse, language as a form of social 
practice.‖
111
 
 
And Sara Mills agrees with the views of Oliver and Fairclough when she says that: 
 
―Within structuralist and post-structuralist theory, the use of the term discourse signaled a major 
break with previous views of language and representation. Rather than seeing language as 
simply expressive, as transparent, as a vehicle of  communication, as a form of representation, 
structuralist theorists and in turn post-structuralists saw language as a system with its own rules 
and constraints, and with its own determining effect on the way that individuals think and express 
themselves. The use of the term discourse, perhaps more than other terms signals this break with 
past views of language.‖
112
  
 
What then is to be understood by the phrase ‗language as a form of social practice‘ that 
is, as discourse?  
 
Alden Chadwick drawing on Michel Foucault is of the view that: 
 
―Discourse means more than words; it is the transmission of words, it is communication –not just 
speaking and writing but also non-verbal acts, physical acts or visual symbols… (it) (my 
inclusion)… may…include professional journals, text books; guidelines; circulars; reports; training 
materials; policies; TV programmes; videos…‖ 
113
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He adds that: 
 
―…Discourse orders the way in which things are experienced and thought about…this does not 
just happen, it happens in the context of institutional practices. Discourses determine what we 
think and what we do; they influence what is included in or what is excluded from social 
organizations‖.
114
 
 
Alden Chadwick also adds that: 
 
―…[All] people would be subject to a number of discourses…sexuality, discipline, health, politics, 
race, employment, class, culture and so on…these different discourses cross and recross the 
social world, sometimes intersecting, sometimes competing, sometimes merging‖
115
 
 
Chadwick drawing from Foucault‘s ―The Order of Discourse‖ states that: 
 
―…[T]here exists in every society procedures to control, select, organize and distribute the 
production of discourse. These procedures determine why a certain thing is seen or not seen; 
why it is described in such a way and analyzed at such a level; why such a word is employed with 
such meaning and in such sentence‖.
116
  
 
Also, Chadwick raises the power/knowledge nexus which is Foucauldian in origin and 
key to Foucault‘s work. Quoting from Foucault: 
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We should admit that power produces knowledge…that power and knowledge imply one another; 
that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge nor any 
knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations‖
117
.  
 
He goes on to say: 
―When I think of the mechanics of power, I think of its capillary form of existence, of the extent to 
which power seeps into the very grain of individuals, reaches right into their bodies, permeates 
their gestures, their posture, what they say, how they learn to live and work with other people‖.
118
 
 
This idea of the permeability of power is underscored by Ann Levett et al when they say 
that: 
 
―Power as Foucault was quick to remind us, is not the exercise of some dramatic force emanating 
from a single point at the apex of the state. The power of apartheid was relayed through millions 
of channels of communication, from the government-controlled media through to everyday 
conversation. Power is, rather, a function of a multiplicity of discursive practices that fabricates 
and positions subjects.‖
119
 
 
The authors restate this when they state that: 
 
…Power is productive rather than only repressive…‖120 
 
Richard Haugman had this to say about discourse: 
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―…Discourse is about the interplay between language and social relationships, in which some 
groups are able to achieve dominance for their interests in the way in which the world is defined 
and acted upon. Such groups include not only dominant economic classes, but also men within 
patriarchy, and white people within …racism…Language is a central aspect of discourse through 
which power is reproduced and communicated‖
121
 
 
Mark Priestly reiterates the view of Richard Haugman when he says that: 
  
―Language is a social phenomenon. As such it is embedded within wider social processes and 
relationships of power. The way we acquire and use language not only reflects our relationship to 
the wider social world, it also reproduces it. When we speak in terms of gender, race, class, age, 
sexuality, or disability we are also contributing to the production of those same social divisions 
and categories. Moreover, when we name ourselves, or when others name us within such 
categories, we too are being produced‖
122
  
 
Vivien Burr, Sara Mills, Mike Oliver, Norman Fairclough, Richard Haugman and Mark 
Priestly raise some key aspects in the understanding of discourse and of the centrality of 
language in discourse. 
 
Vivien Burr is of the view that ―language is not transparent‖. Sara Mills saw ―language as 
a system with its own rules and constraints, and with its own determining effect on the 
way that individuals think and express themselves‖ Mike Oliver says that language is a 
not a ―symbolic system or code but is a discourse‖. Richard Haugman deepens Mike 
Oliver‘s understanding of language by accepting that language should be viewed as a 
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discourse and adding that discourse is about ―the interplay between language and social 
relations‖. Not only is there this interplay between language and social relations he also 
introduces the idea that there are specific groups in society which dominate. And when 
the idea of domination is raised the idea of power can be inferred from this kind of 
relationship. And Haugman is of the view that language is a central aspect of discourse 
through which power is reproduced and communicated. Mark Priestly‘s view of language 
as a social phenomena is that not only is it embedded within wider social processes and 
relations of power it also reproduces these social processes and relations of power. And 
he gives instances where this reproduction of social processes and power relations 
takes place which are in cases of gender, race, class, age sexuality and disability.  He 
believes that these very social categories and social divisions are reproduced within the 
confines of discursive practices of which language is central. Also, key to understanding 
the significance of language in the reproduction of specific categories and power 
relations is the idea of ideology. And John B. Thompson is of the view that relations of 
domination and the ways in which they are sustained by meaningful expressions cannot 
be properly understood without a thorough understanding of the workings of ideology123.    
 
To conclude an argument has been made that discourse definitely has a role to play in 
the peeling back of layers of meaning which hides the source of how certain groups with 
power dominate and ascribe roles and identities to others. The social model of disability 
which has its origins in a critique of capitalism and its preoccupation with structure 
cannot explain the complex dynamics around identity construction. And it for this reason 
that discourse analysis is employed to delve deeper than the common- sense –taken- 
for- granted conceptualizations can be laid bare. And this can be found in the criticism 
and deconstruction of the dominant discourse of capitalist- ableist-normalcy. The idea for 
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this approach is based on resisting the hegemony of ableist society which excludes and 
marginalizes disabled people; it is an act of demolishing the supremacy of the ‗ideal‘ 
citizen who gains power from the production and regulation of social and economic 
structures of inequality and legitimation through his (for he is male) reference to 
professional knowledge. And finally, Mark Priestly concludes that: 
 
―Social model theorists such as Oliver, Finkelstein, Abberley etc have not devoted 
particular attention to the question of meaning and representation…I would support any 
argument which suggests that it is vital to consider material relations: a theoretical 
explanation which neglects the disabling role of society, which ignores socio-economic 
structures, is a mere fantasy. I would equally suggest that mono-linear explanations 
reducing everything to economic factors are misguided…disability is a complex process, 
which involves a number of causal components. Within this, the role of culture and 
meaning is crucial, autonomous and inescapable.‖ 124 
 
Mark Priestly is of the view that there is more to the understanding in terms of how 
disability is constructed. It is agreed that it is a complex category and it cannot just be 
explained in purely structural terms there is the discursive element which needs to be 
drawn into the framework of analysis and deconstruction. The essential structural 
analysis of the social model theorist alone cannot explain all the complexities of the 
construction of disability. And it is hoped that this chapter has brought this element to the 
construction of disability which is crucial for understanding it with the view to constructing 
a legal understanding of disability. 
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CHAPTER 4: AMERICAN DISABILITY LAW 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
Having chartered a path in the social sciences to demonstrate how the structures of 
capitalist society help create the social category, the disabled, and, how by layers of 
ideological, cultural and linguistic discourses this notion is sustained, chapter 4 will show 
how American legal discourse, in the form of the Supreme Court sought to hamper the 
development and protection of disabled people despite the progressive nature of the 
American with Disabilities Act. A case will be made that will demonstrate that, because 
of the narrow interpretation that the Supreme Court has given to defining disability, it has 
made it impossible for disabled people to successfully access the protection of the ADA.  
The structure of the chapter will survey the Supreme Court decisions that have 
hamstrung the stated objectives of the ADA; will address the notion of mitigation as an 
instance of restricting access to the protection of the ADA; and, finally, discuss 
reasonable accommodation and undue hardship as instances of the unwillingness of the 
4.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND   
Ruth O‘Brien states that the American with Disabilities Act (ADA):  
It transforms disability from a medical category that involves a limited group of people into one 
that describes the human condition.‖ 
125
  
Members of the disability community also reacted favourably:  
―it reflect[ed] a paradigm shift of disabled people redefining and reclaiming disability‘ replacing a 
medical model with a social and civil rights model‖ 
126
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‖ the ADA changed awareness of people with disabilities, that they have a right to opportunity 
rather than pity.‖ Moreover…society is more aware of physical accessibility for which the ADA is 
responsible, and it has made people with disabilities aware that they have rights to employment 
…and can ask for accommodations.‖
127
  
―To provide a clear and comprehensive mandate for the elimination of discrimination against 
disabled people.‖
128
 
There was a new galvanized sense amongst disability activists, lawyers and writers that 
highlighted the extreme importance of the plight of the disabled.  
Wendy E. Parmet lends another critically important insight into the ADA when citing Jane 
West‘s observation: 
… [t]he ADA require[d] us to change our thinking about people with disabilities. The ADA 
demands that we focus on people not disabilities; that we focus on what they can do, not on what 
they cannot do.‖
129
 
Jane West‘s observation that placed emphasis on the person rather than on the 
impairment was significant. It sent a message that demanded that society looked at 
disabled people as human beings and not as human beings with impairments; that, 
disabled people were able to be capable and productive members of society if society 
made the necessary accommodations to facilitate what they can do rather than what 
they cannot do.   
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But, if there was a disproportionate concern over the impairments that they have and 
how these could be corrected and medicated rather than a concern for how best they 
could be utilized to make a contribution to society with the assistance of society, then, 
the way in which disabled people will be perceived will be perpetuated by a perception of 
society which does not see, it, society as the key agent in the disabling of impaired 
people. Society has to change; it has to accommodate impaired people. And by 
accommodating impaired people the emphasis moves away from the impairments of 
disabled people as the source and origin of their disability and will correctly be located in 
society as the ultimate agent in disabling people with impairments.   
When we start from the position of the person, it leads us to pose questions about the 
person and his/her relationship to society; there is a dialectical interplay between person 
and society; which hinges on society‘s meanings and interpretations of impaired people 
which manifests itself in specific perceptions, worldviews and thoughts about impaired 
people. And in most cases especially in the work place translates into discrimination of 
impaired people.    
A society dominated by such ableist thinking will wittingly or unwittingly discriminate 
against an impaired person. And, since impaired people do not fit into society‘s 
perception of normal which has been socially constructed in the image of able-bodied 
people, the chances are great that they will be marginalized and discriminated against.  
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4.3 HOW DOES THE ADA DEFINE DISABILITY? 
The ADA states that a person is considered to be disabled when any of the following 
requirements are met: 
 ―…a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life 
activities‘ of such an individual… 
[has] a record of such an impairment‘ refers to an individual who has a history of, or has 
been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits 
one or more major life activities 
…the ‘regarded as‘ prong applies to individuals who have no substantially limiting impairments 
but are treated as if they do or their substantially limiting impairments result from the attitudes of 
others (42 U.S.C.#12102).‖ 
130
   
Also, for the purposes of employment not only must the person claiming to be disabled 
satisfy the criteria of the ―substantially limits‖ clause but they must also be a ―qualified 
individual‖. A ―qualified person‖ is someone who is impaired but is also able to do the 
particular job desired whether or not reasonable accommodations have been made.131 
The essential criteria for the job being that the disabled person must be able to fulfill the 
essential functions of the job132 Judith Johnson emphasises this aspect of the definition 
when she says that:  
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―qualified‖ …means that a person must be able to perform essential job duties of the position with 
or without reasonable accommodation‖
133
  
―To establish a prima facie case under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove: (1) he is a disabled person 
as defined by the ADA; (2) he is qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform 
the essential functions of the job held or desired; and (3) the employer discriminated against him 
because of his disability.‖ 
134
  
 The problem with this enquiry is that in US jurisprudence the majority of disability 
discrimination cases do not reach the stage where the discrimination has to be proved.  
The American Bar Association‘s statistics of Title 1 employment cases makes for 
interesting reading in respect of the success rate of employees claiming disability 
discrimination. It found that from the period 1992 to 1997 only 8% of employees were 
successful in claims based on disability discrimination. The reasons for a 
disproportionate employer success rate in disabilty discrimination cases according to the 
American Bar Association is attributed to the fact that the ADA insists that before the 
question of discrimination can be raised, that the person claiming disability discrimination 
first, had to satisfy the definitional requirements of disability. Where these requirements 
are not met, the chances of successfully pertitioning the courts based on a claim of 
disbility discrimination are reduced.  
As far as the ABA was concerned it was restricting enough that the ADA insisted that the 
definitional requirements of disability were complied with before discrimination could be 
addressed, but it was entirely a different matter when the Supreme Court also imposed a 
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further obstacle in the way of a disabled person by adopting a literalist interpretation to 
defining disability. 135  
―[S]atisfying the requirements that the plaintiff meet the ADA‘s restrictive interpretation of 
disability-a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity-and still be 
qualified to meet the essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation.‖
136
 
This stringent stance in defining disability seriously called into question the extent to 
which a disabled person had to be impaired before they could be protected by the ADA.   
The sense that could be discerned was that the disabled person had to be substantially 
disabled before such protections could be made available and any attempts at mitigation 
of the impairment would oust137 a claim to being disabled.   
Jerome Bickenbach alluded to this view, that the trend to consider an impaired person 
that has been societally disabled as not ―disabled enough‖138is one such manifestation of 
a narrow interpretation of disability which disqualifies disabled persons from the 
protections envisaged by the ADA.  
Wayne Thomas Oake‘s remarks in this regard are instructive when he confirms the 
viewpoint that disabled people are disqualified from the protections of the ADA simply 
because they are not ―disabled enough‖ to warrant the protections. He says: 
―The foremost argument…is that disability protection …offered by the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, have failed in (a) large part to achieve many of its stated objectives…The courts consistently 
find that plaintiffs with disabilities are not disabled within the meaning of the relevant statutes. 
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Plaintiffs must overcome a multifaceted definition of disability, weaving through an obstacle 
course that will often find them either too disabled to qualify for accommodations or insufficiently 
disabled to be eligible for statutory protection.‖
139
  
4.4 WHAT DID THE COURTS SAY? 
The observations and thoughts of the writers discussed above, that rightly placed society 
at the centre of the disabling process, was not given the necessary support by the 
Federal Supreme Court. In fact these decisions fundamentally setback disability rights in 
the USA. These court decisions illustrated that the judiciary especially the Federal 
Supreme Court was not ready to give practical expression to the spirit and hope that was 
generated by the ADA. Their subsequent interpretations and applications of the ADA laid 
a strong emphasis on the impairment of the disabled person rather than to focus, more 
importantly on the disabled person‘s socially induced discrimination which took the form 
of not being hired for a particular job; being dismissed from a particular job; or by not 
being given the necessary reasonable accommodations to do a particular job.  
This discrimination is further exacerbated when a discriminated against disabled person 
sought redress from the courts.  And, the courts in turn, were only concerned with 
whether the person was impaired or not by scrupulously making sure that the disabled 
person complied with all the elements of the definition of disability. The person 
concerned had to first establish that they were indeed impaired in terms of the ADA 
definition before matters of discrimination could be dealt with.  
― What it means to have a disability … is critical to the implementation of the ADA  … the ADA 
generally only protects those who fall within its protected class…Hence cases brought under the 
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statute must face the initial, gatekeeping question, what does it means to be a person with a 
disability.‖
140
 
The Supreme Court‘s first case based on the interpretation of disability in Bragdon v 
Abbott141 adopted a wide, expansive and purposive interpretation of disability. The issue 
in this case was whether a person who was HIV positive could be considered to be 
disabled. The plaintiff in this case, Bragdon, was of the view that Congress intended the 
ADA only to cover those aspects of a person‘s life that have a public, economic, or daily 
character. The point was that a major life activity could only be of an economic, public or 
daily character before it could be considered to have any bearing on a person‘s 
disability. Any other factor outside of this group of activities did not count and in this case 
the issue was about the plaintiff‘s ability to reproduce and that her HIV status should be 
considered as a substantially limiting factor in respect of a major life activity, namely, 
reproducing and bearing children.  Since it is claimed to have undermined this 
considered life activity in a substantial way it followed then that the respondent should be 
considered to be disabled.  
The Supreme Court differed with the interpretation put forward by the plaintiff. The Court 
went further and stated that the interpretation that the plaintiff proffers which restricts 
aspects of a person‘s life only to aspects of an economic, public or daily character does 
not fit in with the definition proffered by the ADA and underscored by Congress.                                                     
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In the Supreme Court‘s words: 
Inclusion on that list of activities such as caring for one‘s self, performing manual tasks, working, 
and learning belies the suggestion that a task must have a public or economic character.‖
142
 
The question raised in Bragdon143 was fundamental. It sought not to exclude the 
respondent from the category of the disabled by extending the ambit of ―major life 
activities‖ to include matters concerning health and reproduction. Secondly, and more 
importantly, it indirectly, raised the question about society‘s involvement, the dentist in 
this case, in the marginalization of impaired people.  Bragdon helped to extend the 
definition of disability by broadly interpreting ―major life activities‖ to include activities 
over an above that of being economic or public by taking into consideration the 
reproductive capacity of the respondent.    
This case demonstrated a willingness on the part of the majority of the Supreme Court to 
look at the discrimination that the plaintiff suffered and would suffer as a result of the 
substantially limiting activity (HIV positive) which impacted upon her ability to reproduce 
(major life activity).  It addressed the discrimination that the woman suffered and would 
suffer because of the substantially limiting activity (HIV status). And by addressing the 
discrimination, Bragdon indirectly, questioned these discriminatory attitudes and 
perceptions which are rooted in society.    
Discrimination is a practice which has its origins in society. It is a social practice which is 
a manifestation of how society relates to impaired persons and this perception leads to 
the disabling of impaired people.  
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And to extend the approach adopted in Bragdon by extension Judges too as members of 
society are not excluded from these practices since they are members of society and are 
informed by particular perceptions of the society in which they live and in this case 
perceptions about disabled people. 
It is from this kind of cultural and social environment that a particular notion of the 
disabled is constructed. These notions lend themselves to common sense constructions 
and popular conceptions of disability which are based on notions of incapacity and 
dependence which in the final analysis are essentially society- disabling acts that are 
geared to disable impaired people. 
To reinforce this viewpoint Marilyn J. Philips writes about how the media and advertising 
reinforce popular conceptions of the disabled: 
―Commercial advertising and the popular media establish and reinforce such notions, powerfully 
influencing social attitudes and behaviour towards persons with disabilities. Newspapers and 
magazine articles, as well as television interviews and editorial commentaries, abound with 
examples of disabled people as damaged goods.‖
144
 
It is within this context fueled by common sense, taken for granted notions of disability 
wherein the Federal Supreme Court of the United States is located. The point is, is that 
the Federal Supreme Court is not immune from these common sense notions of 
disability. Kay Schriner and Richard K. Scotch make the same observation that: 
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 ―[I]f the marginalization of people with disabilities is the result of social processes that are 
embedded in our culture, then it is not surprising that…legal institutions… such as the courts 
frequently mirror well established limiting assumptions about people with disabilities …‖ 
145
 
―The human factor is likely to affect judicial behaviour…Cases that are …factually 
ambiguous…are likely to be determined primarily by judicial preference…how a judge views such 
cases will vary from judge to judge‖
146
 
To illustrate this point the Judge in Vande Zande v State of Wisconsin Department of 
Administration147 perpetuated the idea that impaired people are not deserving of 
accommodation and full participation in society as fully fledged citizens.   
The judge in this case, Judge Posner, ridiculed the plaintiff when she said that to use the 
bathroom instead of the kitchen stigmatized her as different and inferior.  
Her request to work at home was met with a rebuke that‖ most jobs in organizations 
…involve team work…rather than solitary unsupervised work‖ He then further degraded 
when he suggested that the plaintiff might next be asking for cappuccinos and massages 
as reasonable accommodations. He then proceeded to spell out what reasonable 
accommodation meant as far as he was concerned. 
―…the employee must show that the accommodation is reasonable in the sense [that it is]…both 
efficacious and proportional to cost. Even if this prima facie showing is made, the employer has 
an opportunity to prove that upon more careful consideration the costs are excessive in relation to 
either the benefits of accommodations or to the employer‘s financial survival or health.‖
148
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And to drive home his point Judge Posner further opined that: 
―Even if an employer is so large or wealthy – or, like the principal defendant in this case is a state, 
which can raise taxes in order to finance any accommodations that it must make to disabled 
employees – that it may plead ‗undue hardship‘, it would not be required to expend enormous 
sums in order to bring about a trivial improvement in the life of a disabled employee.‖
149
  
The stance however, that the minority judges, Justices Stevens and Breyer, in Sutton v 
United Airlines took, does indicate that some judges indeed have moved away from 
restricting common sense understandings of construing what constitutes disability with 
regard to the ADA. His all important observation was that of interpretation and 
construction of the ADA definition of disability. In that he highlighted the restricting and 
parsing approach adopted by the Sutton Court which construed the three pronged 
definition as three self-contained instances of what constituted a disability. The idea of 
approaching the definition as an interrelated whole was to cast the net widely enough to 
include all people who suffered from an impairment that substantially limited a major life 
activity. 150 So, that if a person claiming disability discrimination was not successful with 
regard to the first prong of the definition, where the impairment substantially limits a 
major life activity presently, then the claimant could resort to the other two prongs in his 
claim based on disability discrimination. Robert Burgdorf raises a point about the 
approach of the Court: 
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―First, because the phrase ―substantially limits‖ appears in the present tense in the ADA definition 
of disability, the Court construed it as requiring a present substantial limitation, not a potential or 
hypothetical one…”
151
(emphasis added) 
And, in the Courts words: 
―A disability exists only where an impairment ‗substantially limits‘ a major life activity, not where it 
‗might,‘ ‗could,‘ or ‗would,‘ be substantially limiting‖
152
 
The implications for this kind of stance is that if a person who claims disability 
discrimination does not succeed on the first prong, and in the reasoning of the court, that 
the disability should presently exist, and not manifest itself later, or existed in the past, 
then, the courts are not obliged to test for disability based on the other two prongs. The 
court will only test for disability if the impairment manifests itself in the here and now, not 
later and not in the past. A claim based on disability discrimination should be tested on 
all three prongs.  
Not only was Justice Stevens critical about the ―plain language‖ approach that the 
Supreme Court adopted in the Sutton case, he was also highly critical of the central 
issue that came before the Court, namely the idea around mitigation or the use of aids, 
medication, palliative devices which mitigated the impairment suffered by disabled 
person. 
When Vande Zande is juaxtaposed with Bragdon there is a patent difference in 
approach. The court in Bragdon clearly displayed an inclusive expansive approach to the 
interpretation of disability; it rooted its decision in the perceptions that society had of 
disabled people. The decision in Vande Zande clearly served to perpetuate and 
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reinforce common- sense held perceptions of disabled people. If the court in Bragdon 
was to decide in the Vande Zande case the probability existed that the outcome would 
have been different in spite of the fact that the Bragdon case dealt with the definition of 
disability and the Vande Zande case dealt with questions of accommodation.  
In the final analysis what these two cases highlighted was the manner in which the 
courts approached the questions asked of them, these two cases bring into stark focus 
how judges too, as products of society, will decide cases depending on the specific 
markers that are of importance to them. In Vande Zande there is a patent disregard for 
the concerns of the disabled person. Judge Posner clearly displayed this rigid unbending 
notion that disabled individuals should bend to the dictates of normal able-bodied 
society. And that it should not be the other way round where society changes and adapts 
to the needs of disabled people. The emphasis and approach in Bragdon proved 
differently. It indirectly highlighted the need for society to think of disabled people as 
worthy of consideration by applying a wider interpretation of disability to ensure that 
people who claim disability are adequately protected by the ADA.   
Having juxtaposed these two cases to draw out the different approaches the two courts 
adopted, it is with regret that in the next four Supreme Court decisions on disability 
discrimination, the Supreme Court adopted the stance taken by Judge Posner in the 
Vande Zande Case.  
In Toyota Motor Manufacturing v Williams153 the facts of this case were first addressed in 
the Sixth Circuit Court and its findings were that Williams‘ impairments were ―sufficiently 
disabling‖ The Court felt that she was substantially limited in a major life activity and her 
ability to perform house hold tasks or tend to her personal grooming did not undermine 
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the conclusion that she was disabled. The Supreme Court subsequently reversed this 
decision. Judge O‘ Connor was of the view that the Sixth Circuit Court was wrong in that 
it restricted its inquiry essentially to her ability to perform tasks at work. The Supreme 
Court‘s construction of major life activity was based on the notion that these activities 
had to be of ―central importance to daily life‖.  The Supreme Court‘s understanding of 
―daily activity‖ did not take into consideration the activity of work and less so, a particular 
kind of job. Work in the sense of holding down a particular kind of job was not for the 
Supreme Court a factor in determining what constituted an activity of ―central importance 
to daily life‖ The court was of the view that the Sixth Circuit Court had to assess her 
overall ability to perform tasks. And because household tasks like bathing, brushing 
teeth, dressing are among the types of tasks central to the daily activities of human 
existence, these should have been taken into consideration when the Sixth Circuit court 
determined whether Williams was substantially limited in a major life activity.  The 
Supreme Court then concluded that because Williams did not show that she was unable 
to perform tasks of ―central importance to daily life‖ she could not be considered to be 
substantially limited in a major life activity.  
This, according to the Judge constitutes an important life activity. This to some extent 
trivialized the idea as to what constituted a major life activity. What could be more major 
as a life activity than work, which in essence forms the core of all human existence? To 
equate work with an everyday activity like brushing one‘s teeth is to completely miss the 
intentions of the ADA as espoused in its preamble. And Susan Gluck Mezey‘s 
observations are on point when she says: 
―…the majority denigrated the significance of her work by holding that the manual tasks she 
performed during working hours were not centrally important and that because she could brush 
her teeth and comb her hair, she was not substantially limited in her ability to perform manual 
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tasks. According to the Court, because she could attend to her personal hygiene, she was not 
disabled and not entitled to the protection of the act, despite her inability to earn a living… .‖ 
154
 
And if one goes back to the preamble of the ADA the primary intentions of the ADA 
clearly articulates the view that the ADA was enacted to: 
 ―…provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities.‖
155
 
The problem it would seem in respect of US disability discrimination lies with the 
disjuncture or the dissonance between how previously cited writers and observers 
expected disability to be defined in the ADA and how eventually it was interpreted by the 
courts. In Three156 significant Federal Supreme Court cases the courts consistently 
addressed the question around issues of how impaired the individual was.   
The conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis of these cases is that the judgments 
did not hinge on the ―elimination of discrimination against people with disabilities‖157 
Rather, the emphasis is founded on ascertaining whether the person is impaired and to 
what extent they are impaired. This kind of emphasis is clearly constructed from a bio-
medical orientation which is founded essentially on the impaired body and the extent of 
its impairment and not on how society fashions a discourse of disablement which arises 
from specific cultural perceptions about the impaired body and manifests itself in 
discrimination.   
4.5 MITIGATING MEASURES   
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To bedevil the understanding of disability even further in Sutton v United Airlines the 
notion of mitigation was at issue. The outcome of the case further restricted the 
protection that the ADA afforded to people claiming to be disabled. It held that a person 
could not be considered to be disabled where an impaired person was able to mitigate 
their impairment by the use of medication or the use of palliatives or any instruments that 
assisted the impaired person in ameliorating the effects of their impairment. This was a 
decision that ran contrary to the EEOC regulations which expressly stated that any 
assistance that an impaired person received which mitigated the effects of the impaired 
person‘s impairment should not be taken into consideration when considering whether a 
particular person was disabled or not.  
The facts in Sutton v United Air Lines158 was that the plaintiffs, applicants for jobs as 
airline pilots with uncorrected vision of 20/200 were not considered to be disabled simply 
because when they corrected their vision with the help of spectacles they were duly 
considered to be not disabled. The court was of the view that their corrected vision did 
not constitute an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity such as work 
and in their case being airline pilots.  
In Murphy v United Parcel Service159 this trend was repeated. The court upheld the 
plaintiff‘s dismissal on the basis that the hypertension that the plaintiff suffered, that 
when mitigated and controlled by the taking of medication which helped the plaintiff 
function normally daily could not be considered to be an impairment that substantially 
limited the plaintiff in a major life activity because of the assistive effect of the 
medication.   
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Finally in Albertson, Inc v Kirkingburg, a commercial truck driver with monocular vision 
was dismissed because he failed to maintain his federal commercial driver‘s certification. 
What is crucial and significant in this case is that a new dimension to mitigation was 
introduced. The idea that where the body was able to compensate within itself to correct 
or mitigate an impairment, the person concerned would not be considered to be 
disabled. The ambit of mitigation was in fact extended in this case because not only 
were medication and devices considered to be mitigating factors, but any coping 
mechanisms that the body itself was able to provide to mitigate any impairment were 
also included. 160 
These three Supreme Court cases have starkly illustrated the US Supreme Court‘s 
stance with regard to who should be admitted to the class of disabled people even to 
such an extent that where a person‘s body was able to compensate or cope with an 
impairment this would oust the person concerned from the class of disabled persons.  
John Hockenberry in an op-ed column in the New York Times, June 29,1999 put the 
Supreme Court‘s position into stark perspective when he wrote: 
―This is something of a revelation. I have a job. I have a family. I travel all over the world. By this 
definition the fact that I use a wheelchair to mitigate my paraplegia suggests that I am not 
disabled‖
161
 
Wayne Thomas Oakes observes further that: 
                                                 
160
 Brian East ―The definition of disability after Sutton v United Airlines‖ 
http://www.nls.org/confbrineast.htm accessed 6 November 2007 
161
 John Hockenberry ―Disability Games". New York Times editorial: June 29, 1999.   
 
 
 
 
 89 
 ―Consequently, if those with disabilities, even by arduous efforts, are able to overcome some of 
the impacts of their disability with various coping techniques, they may then be deemed not 
substantially limited in a major life activity, adjudged not disabled and not covered by the ADA.‖
162
  
To conclude, Wayne Thomas Oakes‘ observations certainly ring true with regard to the 
protection of disabled people when he says that the underlying thinking of the courts, 
and the Supreme Court more so, is that the person claiming disability must be so 
impaired that she/he is unable to perform a major life activity that an average person in 
the general population is able to.163 The person claiming disability must be so impaired 
that he/she is significantly restricted with regard to the condition, manner, or duration in 
the performance of a major life activity in comparison to an average person.164 The 
impairment must be of such a nature that it is irremediable before a person claiming 
disability will be allowed any protection under the ADA.   
4.6 REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS165 AND UNDUE HARDSHIP166 
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Reasonable accommodation in this regard will be discussed in conjunction with undue 
hardship to illustrate once again the restrictive interpretation that the American courts 
have adopted in accommodating disabled people; and on the other hand, how indulgent 
they have been to employers when interpreting the cost that employers have to endure, 
or the hardship, to effect reasonable accommodations for disabled people.The 
discussion will hinge on the role of cost-benefit analysis and the central role that it plays 
in the affording of reasonable accommodations to disabled people.  
4.6.1 REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION  
To underscore the importance of reasonable accommodation for disabled people Jeffrey 
Cooper wrote: 
By imposing the duty of reasonable accommodation, Congress hoped to force employers to 
overcome their preconceived notions about disabilities and focus [instead] on the capabilities of 
individual applicants‖ 
167
 
To support this claim the EEOC Interpretive Guidance stated that: 
―The reasonable accommodation requirement is best understood as a means by which barriers to 
the equal employment opportunity of an individual with a disability are removed or alleviated for 
example . . . physical or structural obstacles…rigid work schedules…inflexible job procedures.‖
168
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And to further augment the importance of reasonable accommodation for the disabled 
section 102(b)(5)(A)169 addressess the link between reasonable accommodation and 
discrimination: 
―. . . discrimination is . . . not making a reasonable accommodation to the known physical and 
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or an 
employee. . ―
170
 
What is of cardinal imprtance in respect of discrimination and its link to reasonable 
accommodation, that Cliona Kimber raises, is that the failure on the part of the employer 
to provide reasonable accommodation is considered to be discriminatory. A closer 
reading suggests that there is a duty placed on the employer to act, there is ―an 
affirmative‖171 duty to ensure that disabled people receive the necessary 
accommodations in the work place; inaction on the part of the employer is considered to 
be discriminatory.  
The EEOC regulations also make it very clear that the duty to provide reasonable 
accommodations ―is bound up with ( and keyed into)‖172 enabling individuals to perform 
the essential functions of the job and this is crucial because in the final analysis for 
disabled people to be productively employed they need to be able to do the job that they 
are applying for.  
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In section 101(8) of the ADA173 the question of the ―qualified person with a disability is 
dealt with. A qualified person is a person: 
―with or without, reasonable accommodation, can perfom the essential functions of the 
employment position that such individual holds or desires‖
174
 
The EEOC regulations exapands on this definitionto include a person who: 
―satifies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the 
employment position such person holds or desires and who, with or without reasonable 
accommodation can perform the essential functions of the job‖
175
 
And the EEOC specifies that the essential functions of the job should mean the 
fundamental job duties of the position and does not include the marginal aspects of the 
job, and, the reason that the job exists is precisely to perfrom that specific function or 
because there are a few people who can do this particular job or because the position is 
a highly specialised position and the disabled person is being hired because of his 
expertise .176 
 4.6.2 UNDUE HARDSHIP 
Undue hardship is a defence that an employer can drawn on where it is found that the 
accommodations that are being made to ensure that a disabled person in the work-place 
is in a position to perform the essential requirements of the job are onerous. Originally, 
the test to establish the extent to which an employer should suffer in its attempts at 
making reasonable accommodations with regard to a disable person was up to the point 
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where the very existence of the employer‘s business was threatened, the so-called 
bankrupt provision. This would mean all ‗reasonable accommodations‘ could be 
requested and complied with short of bankrupting the employer.177    
This test however has been changed  and to reduce this burden on employers, 
Congress left in place a substantial duty to accommodate however,  an accommodation 
now, does not cause undue hardship unless it requires "significant difficulty or 
expense.‖178 
The factors indicate that what matters most in determining whether an accommodation 
causes undue hardship is not the cost of the accommodation in the abstract, but rather 
the employer's ability to bear the cost.179 
 As originally introduced, the Act called for a very high standard: an accommodation 
would not be unreasonable unless it threatened the continued existence of the 
employer's business.  
4.6.2.1. The Role of Cost Benefit Analysis 
To get to grips with the thinking around making reasonable accommodations available in 
US disability jurisprudence an apt beginning would be to consider the stance taken by 
Judge Posner in Vande Zande v. State of Wisconsin Department of Administration180. 
For Posner accommodation meant that:  
―the employee must show that the accommodation is reasonable in the sense [ that it is] ... both 
efficacious and proportional to cost. Even if this prima facie showing is made, the employer has 
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an opportunity to prove that upon more careful consideration the costs are excessive in relation to 
either the benefits of accommodations or to the employer‘s financial survival or health‖ 
In Borkowski v. Valley Central School District181,‘ Judge Calabresi held that an 
accommodation is reasonable only if the costs are not clearly disproportionate to the 
benefits that it will produce. 
―the concept to reasonable accommodation permits the employer to expect the same level of 
performance from individuals with disabilities as it expects from the rest of the workforce ... But, 
the requirement of reasonable accommodation anticipates that it may cost more to obtain that 
level of performance from an employee with a disability than it would to obtain the same level of 
performance from the rest of the work force‖  
 
For Posner the burden lies with the employee to show that reasonable accommodation 
is both efficacious and proportional to cost and that it should be ―something less than the 
maximum possible care‖182. And what is crucial to their understanding of making 
reasonable accommodations and should be borne upper most, is that, for them the 
employee should be reasonable in the asking for accommodations.  Judge Calabresi, 
stated that the term ―reasonable‖ was a relational one that evaluated the desirability of a 
particular accommodation according to the consequences that it would engender both as 
to benefits and to costs. The issue that can be raised from this reasoning is that the onus 
lies with the employee to be reasonable if accommodations are to be made by the 
employer and reasonable means little or no cost to accommodate a disabled employee.   
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Calabresi‘s reasoning is fraught with the common sense notions of the capabilities of 
disabled people. By alluding to the fact that reasonable accommodations implied that 
disabled people can not perform the same as able bodied people in the work place 
unless they were accommodated. And if an employer wanted to maintain these 
performance levels consistent with other members of the work force then he/she would 
have to incur a cost by making reasonable accommodations. And if the employee was 
not reasonable, that is, that the costs to make the accommodation exceeded the 
benefits, then the employer was not obliged to make the accommodation.  
 
In Trans WorldAirlines Inc v. Hardison183, it was held that an accommodation creating 
more than a de-minimis cost constitutes an undue hardship.  
 
 In Willock v Delta Airlines184, the court evaluated a request to work at home by focusing 
on so called expense, lack of supervision, ―risks‖ to computer networks, equipment and 
possible compromises of confidential information.  The court further argued that ―most 
jobs, like the plaintiff‘s cannot be performed at home without a substantial reduction in 
the quality and productivity of the employee‘s performance. The level of hardship 
imposed on the employer was not part of the analysis, but, it seems that inconvenience 
was considered and somehow factored into a comparison of costs and benefits.  
 
In Stone v City of Mt Vernon185 the court went further than Posner and imposed a cost 
benefit responsibility on the plaintiff. The court stated that the plaintiff has an obligation 
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to ensure that the requested accommodation does not impose costs on the employer 
that clearly exceed the benefits of the accommodation. 
 
Gathering from the cases cited above in the United States the courts are quite sensitive 
to the costs of any accommodations imposed on the employer. Reasonable 
accommodations are dependent on a cost-benefit analysis and only awarded where 
costs and benefits are roughly proportional to each other. It also appears that the cost 
and inconvenience to the employer must be relatively insignificant while the benefit of 
accommodations to the employer must be significant.  
 
However, in an article186 by Michael Ashley Stein he cites evidence from an empirical 
study done by Professor Peter Blanck which shows in some cases that an employer‘s 
reliance on undue hardship as a defence against making reasonable accommodations 
for disabled people in the work place is not always well founded. Michael Ashley Stein in 
citing this evidence, however, warns that the evidence acquired in this study should not 
make the assumption that the evidence from this study should be extrapolated as a 
generality for all work places given the great variability from work-place to work-place. 
But what is important, is that it gives an insight, to some extent, into the quantifiable 
costs that businesses have to incur to make reasonable accommodations for disabled 
people.  Overall 72% of accommodations required no cost, 17% carried an expenditure 
of less than $100.00 and only 1% cost between $500.00 and $1000.00.187 
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On the other side of the coin the external benefits that accrue to employers who bear the 
cost of reasonable accommodations are relatively substantial. A federal agency found 
that, on average for every dollar spent on accommodation companies saved $50.00 in 
net benefits.  To expand on this trend Prof Blanck referred to the ―ripple effects‖ 
emanating from the making of accommodations available to disabled people in the work-
place and amongst these desirable consequences was that productivity was higher, 
reports of greater dedication, better identification of qualified candidates, and the 
enjoyment of fewer insurance claims and so on.188 
To conclude, in this chapter an argument was made that US disability jurisprudence was 
interpreted too strictly, resulting in the needless exclusion of a great many disabled 
people from the protections of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The parsimonious 
literal interpretation as to what constitutes a disability with the ―substantially limiting‖ 
clause being the Achilles heel of persons alleging disability should be reviewed. The use 
of the mitigation strategy to render disabled people not disabled as decided in the Sutton 
Trilogy of cases should also be reviewed. The use of a cost/benefit analysis to under 
gird whether reasonable accommodations will be made or not detracts from the duty that 
employers have towards disabled people in the work place.  
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CHAPTER 5: CANADIAN DISABILITY LAW 
Having analyzed the restrictive approach to disability jurisprudence in chapter 4 of the 
American Federal Supreme court, attention will turn to the Canadian position on 
disability discrimination. It is a jurisprudence that broadly interprets definitions of 
disability and more importantly deals with the discrimination that the disabled person 
suffers because of the impairment. It is also a jurisprudence that correctly lays the 
reason for and impaired person‘s disability at the door of society. It is a jurisprudence 
that squarely addresses and locates disability in society. For them society disables.  
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The argument of this chapter will be structured in five parts. It will discuss the importance 
of substantive equality in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; the purposive 
interpretive approach in Canadian jurisprudence; how Canadian jurisprudence 
approaches discrimination with regard to disability and the social model orientations of 
Canadian disability jurisprudence, an exercise in method will be employed utilizing the 
Levac case to illustrate how, in the main, Canadian jurisprudence approaches disability 
discrimination and lastly, an exposition on reasonable accommodations and undue 
hardship will be dealt, again, to show the difference in approach of the two legal 
systems.   
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5.2 THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS: SUBSTANTIVE 
EQUALITY 
Section 15 (1) The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter) states: 
―Every individual is equal before the law and under the law and has the right to equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without 
discrimination based on race, national ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or mental 
health or physical disability189.‖ 
Section 15 of the Charter plays a pivotal role in setting the boundaries and conditions 
necessary for the eradication of any form of discrimination in Canadian society. Section 
15 is essentially grounded in the ideas of equality and human dignity, and any form of 
discrimination will be tested against it, and, if found to contradict it, will be struck down. It 
sets the ultimate standard by which every action will be judged in Canadian society.  
Also, not only does section 15 form the cornerstone of Canadian society, section 15 is 
primarily and essentially premised on a particular notion of equality, namely, substantive 
equality. And at the core of this notion of equality are the eradication of any form of 
discrimination and the restoration of human dignity.  
In Law v Canada190 Iacobucci J touched on the notions of human dignity and freedom 
when he explained what the purpose of section 15 was:  
―It may be said that the purpose of s. 15 is to prevent the violation of essential human dignity and 
freedom through the imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or social prejudice, and 
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to promote a society in which all persons enjoy equal recognition at law as human beings or as 
members of Canadian society, equally capable and equally deserving of concern, respect and 
consideration.‖ 
To drive home the importance of section 15 Iacobucci J spelt out at length what it meant 
when he said: 
―Human dignity means that an individual or group feels self-respect and self-worth.  Human 
dignity is harmed by unfair treatment premised upon personal traits or circumstances which do 
not relate to individual needs, capacities, or merits. It is enhanced by laws which are sensitive to 
the needs, capacities, and merits of different individuals, taking into account the context 
underlying their differences.  Human dignity is harmed when individuals and groups are 
marginalized, ignored, or devalued, and is enhanced when laws recognize the full place of all 
individuals and groups within Canadian society.  Human dignity within the meaning of the equality 
guarantee does not relate to the status or position of an individual in society per se, but rather 
concerns the manner in which a person legitimately feels when confronted with a particular law.  
Does the law treat him or her unfairly, taking into account all of the circumstances regarding the 
individuals affected and excluded by the law?‖
191
 
The key underlying principle of section 15 and its concern for human dignity is the 
principle of substantive equality.192 What is substantive equality? 
Jonathan Penney explains the essential nature of substantive equality and its 
relationship with human dignity by highlighting the core importance of difference.   
―In order to give proper concern and respect for the dignity of people, differences among people 
must be taken into consideration‖
193
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This recognition of difference will require different treatment in order to achieve equality. 
And this is fundamental to the idea of substantive equality.194 
He drives home his point by drawing on the succinct remarks McIntyre J made in 
Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia195.  
―Accommodation of differences…is the essence of equality.‖
196
 
Macintyre J further explained the notion of difference which per se did not necessarily 
mean unequal. He said that it must be recognized that every difference in treatment 
between individuals under the law will not necessarily result in inequality, and, also, that 
identical treatment may frequently produce serious inequality.197 
 
This particular understanding of equality is in stark contrast to understanding equality in 
purely formalistic terms. Formal equality is based on the principle of equal treatment. 
And key to a formal notion of equality is the idea of treating all people the same, 
regardless of the differences amongst them.  People who are alike should be treated 
alike. According to Robert T. Long: 
 
―Some thinkers draw a distinction between formal equality and substantive equality, where formal 
equality means … the same laws applying equally to everyone—while substantive equality 
requires abolishing, or at least greatly reducing, differences in wealth, opportunity, or 
influence.‖
198
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196
 At p 169 
197
 (n 9) p 21 http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en1989/1989rcs1-143/1989rcs1-143.html  Accessed 3 
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Sandra Fredman expands on this understanding of equality in a paper she presented for 
the South African Journal on Human Rights Conference held 5-7 July 2004 when she 
provides four cardinal aspects of substantive equality: 
 
―…[E]quality ought to encompass four central aims. First, it should break the cycle of 
disadvantage associated with out –groups. Second, it should promote respect for the equal 
dignity and worth of all, thereby redressing stigma, stereotyping, humiliation and violence 
because of membership of an out-group. Third, it should entail positive affirmation and 
celebration of identity with community, and, finally, it should facilitate full participation in 
society.‖
199
 
 
And she goes on to explain: 
 
―It can be seen from this that the positive duty to promote equality includes a duty to make 
positive provision …it is not sufficient for positive measures to remove barriers…in addition it is 
necessary to take active steps to make sure that individuals are equipped to take advantage of 
opportunities‖
200
  
 
The key aspect of Sandra Fredman‘s point of view is that it is not enough to break down 
barriers that constrain equality, but that co-terminously, there exists a positive duty to 
make sure that individuals are equipped to take advantage of the opportunities that are 
presented to them in the pursuit of realizing their full potential as citizens. Individuals 
must be in a position to fully enjoy the right that has been conferred upon them. If 
equality means that I have a right to be accommodated in my workplace because of a 
                                                 
199
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particular impairment that I suffer from, then it means that I am able to enjoy that right in 
a very material and substantive way. This is the stark difference between formal rights 
and substantive rights. With regards to the latter there exists a positive duty to act, and 
with regards to the former there is no duty to act, in respect of the proposed right.  This 
ties in with the general thrust of section 15. 
 The analytical framework and interpretative construction of section 15 were grounded 
and developed in four201 important Supreme Court of Canada cases.  
 For Cliona Kimber, The phrase ―every individual is equal before the law and under the 
law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law highlights two 
important aspects of section 15. First, it raises the question of interpretation; and, 
secondly, which is of paramount importance, it signaled that for Canadian jurisprudence 
the idea of ―equality was to be given a substantive content‖202. Furthermore, for her, 
equality should not only have a ―substantive content,‖ but also be ―results-oriented and 
which lays emphasis on appropriate remedies‖.203    
The Andrews case204 aptly illustrates this: the Court was not prepared to see section 15 
of the Charter as a guarantee of formal equality only, but, in fact, as a promoter of 
substantive equality. The Court focused on the effects of the discriminatory practice, 
rather than try to establish what the intent of the discriminator was. Additionally it was of 
crucial importance for the correct understanding of equality that the Court found that 
unintentional systemic discrimination was prohibited as far as section 15 of the Charter 
was concerned. Intention was not a factor in establishing whether somebody had been 
                                                 
201
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discriminated against; rather, the effect of the alleged discriminatory practice was key.205  
The words of McIntyre J are apt in this regard: 
― …discrimination may be described as a distinction, whether intentional or not … which has the 
effect of imposing burdens, obligations or disadvantages on [an] … individual or group not to 
imposed upon others, or which limits access to opportunities, benefits and advantages available 
to other members of society‖
206
 
5.3 THE CHARTER - CONTEXTUAL INTERPRETATION: PURPOSE AND CONTEXT 
The Charter is the foremost piece of legislation in Canadian society, and, to give it its 
overarching and all important place therein it also has to be interpreted in a particular 
way, to ensure its relevance in the quest to acquit itself of its stated objectives and 
mandate, namely, the pursuit of equality and human dignity. In two important cases207 
the interpretative approach that was to be used when interpreting the provisions of the 
Charter was made abundantly clear, to ensure that the scope and intent of the Canadian 
Constitution was given its fullest expression. In the Big M. Drug Mart case Chief Justice 
Dickson set out what the proper interpretative approach should be with regard to the 
Charter: 
―The purpose of the right or freedom in question is to be sought by reference to the character and 
larger objects of the Charter itself, to the language chosen to articulate the specific right or 
freedom, to the historical origins of the concepts enshrined and where applicable, to the meaning 
and purpose of the other specific rights and freedoms with which it is associated within the text of 
the Charter.‖ 
208
 
                                                 
205
 At p 184 
206
 At p 184 
207
 R v Big M. Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 and Regina v Oakes , [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. 
208
 At p 344. 
 
 
 
 
 105 
The interpretative approach adopted by Chief Justice Dickson is suggestive of a method 
which seeks to use every possible interpretative device to achieve a particular objective, 
and, in this case, the enforcing of a particular right or freedom. In the quest to satisfy this 
goal he sets out some markers or devices that could be employed to achieve this.  Some 
of the devices that he believes should be employed are to refer to: ―character and larger 
objects of the Charter itself‖; ―the language used to articulate the specific right or 
freedom‖; and ―the historical origins of the concepts‖. The Chief Justice clearly is of the 
view that a particular right or freedom should be given the fullest and widest possible 
interpretation and appreciation, given the specific circumstances, so that it can be of real 
benefit to its intended recipient. Jonathan Penney supports the view that if this goal 
oriented purposive method is to achieve its desired goal it requires a: 
 ―[B]road liberal interpretation of the Charter‘s rights, freedoms and protections‖ 209 
Jonathan Penney is further of the view that not only must the Charter be broadly and 
liberally interpreted, it in fact demands to be understood within the particular confines of 
the context in which it occurs.  Hence, of paramount importance is the necessity to 
understand the particular provision within its unique set of circumstances; a contextual 
analysis is, therefore, vital. To support his assertion he draws on the insights of Wilson J 
in a freedom of speech case in Alberta210: 
 ―The Charter should be applied to individual cases using a contextual rather than an abstract 
approach.  A contextual approach recognizes that a particular right or freedom may have a different 
value depending on the context and brings into sharp relief the aspect of the right or freedom which 
is truly at stake in the case as well as the relevant aspects of any values in competition with it.   
                                                 
209
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This approach is more sensitive to the reality of the dilemma posed by the particular facts of a case 
and is more conducive to finding a fair and just compromise between two competing values … The 
importance of a Charter's right or freedom, therefore, must be assessed in context rather than in the 
abstract and its purpose must also be ascertained in context.‖ 
In Regina v Oakes211 the purposive approach to interpretation was once again confirmed in 
a presumption of innocence case. The Chief Justice reiterated that section 11 (d) of the 
Charter constitutionally entrenched the presumption of innocence as part of the supreme 
law of Canada, and that to interpret the meaning of s 11(d) ―it is important to adopt a 
purposive approach‖.212He concludes by saying that one of the important tools when 
beginning the interpretative process is to understand the intrinsic value that the relevant 
provision embodies. In his words: 
―To identify the underlying purpose of the Charter right in question, therefore, it is important to begin 
by understanding the cardinal value it embodies‖
213
 
Wayne Thomas Oakes, citing Regina v Oakes, affirms the liberal interpretation idea 
when he says: 
―The court emphasized the need to liberally construe constitutional protections as such an 
interpretation was central to the goal of advancing equality.‖
214
   
In the Oakes case Chief Justice Dickson was at pains to emphasize the importance of 
adopting the proper interpretative tool when the questions of equality and freedom were 
at issue. In the words of the Chief Justice: 
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―The presumption of innocence is a hallowed principle lying at the very heart of criminal law. 
Although protected expressly in s. 11(d) of the Charter, the presumption of innocence is referable 
and integral to the general protection of life, liberty and security … The presumption of innocence 
protects the fundamental liberty and human dignity of any and every person accused by the State 
of criminal conduct. An individual charged with a criminal offence faces grave social and personal 
consequences, including potential loss of physical liberty, subjection to social stigma and 
ostracism from the community … In the light of the gravity of these consequences the 
presumption of innocence is crucial. It ensures that until the State proves the accuser‘s guilt 
beyond reasonable doubt, he or she is innocent. This is essential in a society committed to 
fairness and social justice.‖
215
 
And finally, a further instance to show this expansive, purposive trend in Canadian 
jurisprudence generally, around the question of interpretation. The Quebec Charter of 
Rights, in keeping with the Charter, did not have a definition of the term ―handicap‖, and 
in Quebec v Montreal216 the Court had cause to deal with this issue. It found that: 
―A liberal and purposive interpretation and a contextual approach support a broad definition of the 
word ―handicap‖…‖handicap‖ must not be confined within a narrow definition that leaves no room 
for flexibility.‖ 
217
  
To summarize, thus far: any right or freedoms guaranteed by the Charter should not only 
be widely and liberally interpreted but should be assessed and analysed within the 
bounds of its particular context and circumstances.  
Finally in the words of Iacobucci J:   
                                                 
215
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―It is inappropriate to attempt to confine analysis under s. 15(1) of the Charter to a fixed and 
limited formula.  A purposive and contextual approach to discrimination analysis is to be 
preferred, in order to permit the realization of the strong remedial purpose of the equality 
guarantee, and to avoid the pitfalls of a formalistic or mechanical approach.‖
218
 
5.4 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DISCRIMINATION IN CANADIAN DISABILITY LAW 
In stark contrast to the United States as argued in chapter four, the Canadian treatment 
of disability follows a different path. Canadian jurisprudence approaches disability 
discrimination in a purposive way by looking at the discrimination that the disabled 
person suffered. Canadian thinking on this aspect is not reduced to showing that a 
particular bio-medical condition is substantially limiting and, therefore, renders the 
person concerned unable to do particular class of job or to remain in a particular class of 
job. Rather than concentrating on defining who is disabled by having to meet a strict and 
rigid set of criteria, the Canadian position at the outset addresses the discrimination that 
the person experiences as a result of the manner in which society views the bio-medical 
condition or impairment from which that person suffers. This approach has its origins in 
the Canadian Constitution: the Charter in section 15(1) 219 very clearly states that 
everyone is equal before the law, and that nobody should be discriminated against 
based on such categories as, race, gender and of particular importance for the purposes 
of this study, disability.  
The discrimination that a disabled person suffers is crucial and fundamental to 
addressing issues of disability discrimination in Canadian jurisprudence. The fact that 
Canadian disability jurisprudence lays emphasis on the discrimination that an impaired 
                                                 
218
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person suffers, indicates a fundamental shift in how it approaches disability 
discrimination, compared to the approach in the USA.  Section 2 of the Canadian Human 
Rights Act conveys the intentions, scope and spirit of the Act which is clearly based on 
creating the circumstances for the development of the specific categories220 that it 
speaks to. In the words of the Act:  
―The purpose of this Act is to extend the laws in Canada to give effect …  to the principle that all 
individuals should have an opportunity equal with other individuals to make for themselves the 
lives that they are able and wish to have and to have their needs accommodated, consistent with 
their duties and obligations as members of society, without being hindered in or prevented from 
doing so by discriminatory practices based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, 
sex, sexual orientation, marital status, family status, disability …‖
221
.  
The Human Rights Act‘s intentions reiterate without reservation the Charter‘s intentions 
quite clearly. It sees ―all individuals‖ as having the potential to advance, and to live the 
lives that they are able to carve out for themselves, without being hindered by, or being 
prevented by, discriminatory practices based on race, national or ethnic origin, religion, 
age, sex…or disability.  These two pieces of legislation are of the view that these social 
cleavages should not be an impediment or barrier to the advancement and development 
of any individual in society, and that where accommodations are needed for that 
advancement and development then they should be forthcoming so that all individuals 
are able to their lives as equals, with dignity, and, also, in the best possible position to 
fully realize their potential.   
A key observation that can be discerned from the Human Rights Act is that it is located 
within a context which suggests that the notion of equality is of vital importance to 
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advance the idea of human dignity.  It moves from the position that nobody in society 
should be treated in a manner that infringes upon their rights to equality and human 
dignity simply because they are different. It is a piece of legislation that seeks to root out 
socially constructed discriminations. It is in the spirit of this piece of legislation that 
disabled people in Canada have been more fortunate than their counterparts in the 
United States, whenever the courts have to decide on cases dealing with disability 
discrimination.      
The Canadian courts also employ a more expansive interpretation to their understanding 
of disability, and pivotally, as argued above, rather emphasize the discrimination that the 
disabled person suffered as a result of an impairment as opposed to the practice in the 
USA, which seeks to determine whether or not the disabled person‘s claims that he or 
she is impaired conforms to a technical definition as to whether he/she is disabled or not 
as is the practice in the USA.222  
The Employment Equity Act in the area of employment obligates employers to identify 
and eliminate discriminatory employment practices and promote a proper representation 
of four equality seeking groups, including disabled people within the federally regulated 
workforce. What is significant of the Employment Equity Act is that it identifies four 
separate groups of disabled people but nowhere in its identification of these disabled 
people does it resort to a process of evaluating the bio-medical condition of these 
people. Plainly put it does not embark upon a meticulous investigation to establish 
whether a person claiming to be impaired indeed does have such an impairment and the 
extent of the impairment.223 
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5.5 THE SOCIAL MODEL ORIENTATION OF CANADIAN LAW 
In the Quebec v Montreal City another significant aspect of Canadian jurisprudence was 
raised that tied in with the important notions of human dignity and equality, and the role 
that discrimination plays in undermining these concepts. In its approach to eradicating 
disability discrimination the Court correctly identified and located the source of disability 
discrimination as being within society, urging that:   
 ―. . .  courts should adopt a multi-dimensional approach that considers the socio-political 
dimension of “handicap”
224
 (my emphasis). 
The remarks made by the Court are quite instructive because it urged the courts to take 
note of the social and political aspects of ―handicap‖225. To expand, it highlighted the 
importance of taking into account the socio-political context in which ―handicap‖ was 
located. When the Court signposts the socio-political aspects of ―handicap‖ as being 
important, the inference that can be drawn from such a statement is the key role that 
power plays with regard to the social construction of ―handicap‖.  People with power 
within a particular social context have the power to ascribe a particular status and social 
category in society to others.   
Coupled with the idea of social context, of importance for the Court were the notions of 
human dignity and equality, rather than a narrow focus ―on the bio-medical condition.‖226  
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The warning from the courts to refrain from a narrow focus on the ―bio-medical‖ 
condition, that is, the impairment per se, of the impaired person is a warning which 
seeks to eradicate the possibility for stereotyping and prejudice.227 
The crucial part of the Court‘s judgment is, that it correctly foregrounds the importance of 
understanding an impaired person‘s ―bio – medical condition‖ (impairment) within the 
social context in which it takes place and the meaning that is attributed to it within that 
social context.  The significance of an impaired person‘s ―bio-medical condition‖ is: that, 
in a society that is dominated by able –bodied persons, the meaning that is ascribed to 
an impaired person because of the ―bio-medical condition‖ from which they suffer, is that 
impaired people are perceived as not being normal and, in so doing are stereotyped and 
prejudiced against which results in a downgraded marginalized person.  
This very act of stereotyping and prejudice manifests itself in discriminatory practices. It 
is a disabling activity on the part of able-bodied society to which impaired people are 
subjected. Able-bodied society creates the circumstances for an impaired person to be 
discriminated against. Therefore, able-bodied society, in its prejudice and stereotyping 
which manifests in discrimination, is central to the construction of disability. Michael Lynk 
supports this view when he says that: 
―The thrust of the contemporary legal approach towards disability is to separate the truly disabling 
features of a person‘s impairment from the unnecessary burdens sustained by discriminatory 
attitudes, laws, practices, and structural barriers. In other words, a person with a disability should 
be assessed in light of their own true abilities and not by the filter of our own prejudices, 
assumptions, stigmas and misunderstandings of their impairment.‖
228
  
And drives home his point: 
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―The Supreme Court of Canada, in Montreal (City) has accepted the social critique of our 
traditional attitudes towards disability because they (our traditional attitudes) (my addition) locate 
the problem of disablement solely within the domain of the person with a disability, and thereby 
ignore the significant role played by society in constructing mutable barriers in the workplace and 
other environments.‖
229
  
 
And concludes: 
 
―In its judgment, the Court urged a broad definition of disability, and directed that it must take into 
account the social context of the impairment.‖
230
 
 
5.6 AN EXERCISE IN METHODOLOGY: LEVAC VS CANADIAN ARMED FORCES. 
To illustrate the discrimination based approach that Canadian jurisprudence has adopted 
in dealing with disability its key elements will be demonstrated in an examination of the 
Tribunal case, Levac vs Canadian Armed Forces231.   
In this case, the Tribunal was not persuaded that, based on the evidence, a real risk of 
sufficient proportions was demonstrated to exist which would justify the outright 
exclusion of the Complainant or others like him from continuing his employment in the 
Canadian Armed Forces simply because his medical condition as determined by the 
Respondent indicated that he was in less than perfect health.  
 
By analyzing the Levac case it will be shown to what extent the Tribunal was not 
persuaded by the case made by the Respondent. It will also demonstrate the extent to 
which judicial forums, like the Tribunal, will go to ensure that an employer, when 
discriminating against a prohibited category, like the disabled, has exhausted all possible 
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avenues short of suffering hardship that goes to the very existence and sustainability of 
the business in question. Anything short of such undue hardship does not exculpate the 
employer from a charge of discrimination. 
  
In deciding this case the Tribunal took into consideration four important aspects: 1.Did 
the Respondent discriminate against the Complainant on a prohibited ground of 
discrimination, namely, physical disability?232  
2. If the Respondent did discriminate based on a prohibited ground did he invoke the 
Bona Fide Occupational Requirement defence? 233 
3. Did the Respondent reasonably accommodate the Complainant in the face of the 
alleged discrimination up to the point of undue hardship? What does the law234 say in 
this regard?  
The law is quite clear in that an employer cannot discriminate directly or indirectly 
against a disable person by dismissal or by differentiating adversely against him or her. 
However, if an employer does discriminate against a disabled person, the onus is on the 
employer to show on a balance of probabilities that the reason for the discrimination was 
based on good grounds. These good grounds have to be based on a bona fide 
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occupational requirement. To ensure that no frivolous or spurious bona fide occupational 
requirement is given as justification for the discrimination the Etobicoke case235 set in 
place the test for a bona fide occupational requirement. BFOR is both a subjective and 
an objective test. Justice McIntyre laid down the now oft-cited criteria: 
The subjective test: 
 
"To be a bona fide occupational qualification and requirement, a limitation, such as mandatory 
retirement at a fixed age, must be imposed honestly, in good faith, and in the sincerely held belief 
that such limitation is imposed in the interests of the adequate performance of the work involved 
with all reasonable dispatch, safety and economy, and not for ulterior or extraneous reasons 
aimed at objectives which could defeat the purpose of the Code."
236
 
 
In addition to the subjective test, the BFOR requirement must meet the objective test 
which was described as follows: 
 
"In addition it must be related in an objective sense to the performance of the employment 
concerned, in that it is reasonably necessary to assure the efficient and economical performance 
of the job without endangering the employee, his fellow employees and the general public."
237
 
 
An analysis of these two tests indicates that there is a seriousness that can be gleaned 
from the language used.  The use of the word ―must‖ displays the peremptory nature of 
the language. The language of the judgment does not give the employer discretion in 
this matter. The language clearly displays un-ambiguously that, with regard to the 
subjective test, the bona fide occupational requirement ―must be imposed honestly‖ ―in 
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good faith‖ ―and not for ulterior or extraneous reasons aimed at objectives which could 
defeat the purpose of the Code‖. 
 
With regard to the objective test, again, there is the lack of discretion allowed to the 
employer, Justice McIntyre stated that the BFOR:  
 
―[M]ust be related in an objective sense to the performance of the employer concerned, in that it 
is reasonably necessary to assure the efficient and economical performance of the job without 
endangering the employee, his fellow employees and the general public.‖ 
238
 
 
Anything short of this would not satisfy the BFOR test. In the light of this exposition the 
Tribunal naturally, after a consideration of all the facts and circumstances, came to the 
conclusion that the Respondent could not establish a justification for dismissing the 
Complainant based on the BFOR test.  
The Tribunal, though, did establish that the Complainant was dismissed because of his 
disability.   
 
The Tribunal declared that to come to another conclusion, namely, one that favoured the 
employer, would be tantamount to opening the floodgates for employers to embark upon 
routine or non-routine examinations, with a view to establishing the existence of degrees 
of disability, slight or otherwise, in their employees, in the hope of circumventing the 
main purpose of the Act, which is the elimination of illegal discrimination. This would be 
a flagrant violation of the Canadian Human Rights Act. The Tribunal went on to say that 
it would be untenable if, in violation of the Act, it were to countenance acts of 
discrimination against persons who were disabled in Canadian society.        
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To under gird the decision by the Tribunal, the Supreme Court in Alberta Human Rights 
Commission vs Central Alberta Dairy Pool,239 declared that there existed a legal 
obligation for the Respondent to take appropriate reasonable steps up to the point of 
undue hardship to accommodate the Complainant, who was adversely affected by the 
Respondent's discriminatory practice. Moreover, it was further declared that there was 
an onus upon the Respondent to establish that it had made serious efforts to 
accommodate the Complainant's impairment   without the Respondent having suffered 
undue hardship. 
 
Justice Wilson declared as follows citing Dickson CJ: 
 
"Dickson C.J., in effect, focused upon the bona fide aspect of the BFOR and found that an 
occupational requirement could not be imposed bona fide unless the employer had exercised its 
duty to accommodate those on whom the requirement would have an adverse impact. The 
purpose of the Canadian Human Rights Act, S.C. 1976- 77, c. 33, he stressed, was to prevent 
discrimination, and discrimination resulting from adverse impact could only be prevented by 
importing into the BFOR a duty to accommodate.‖
240
 
 
―The words "occupational requirement" meant that the requirement must be manifestly 
related to the occupation in which the individual complainant is engaged. Once it is 
established that a requirement is "occupational", however, it must further be established 
that it is "bona fide". A requirement which is prima facie discriminatory against an 
individual, even if it is in fact "occupational", is not bona fide for the purpose of s. 14(a) if 
its application to the individual is not reasonably necessary in the sense that undue 
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hardship on the part of the employer would result if an exception or substitution for the 
requirement were allowed in the case of the individual. In short, while it is untrue the 
words "occupational requirement" refers to a requirement manifest to the occupation as 
a whole the qualifying words "bona fide" require an employer to justify the imposition of 
an occupational requirement on a particular individual when such imposition has 
discriminatory effects on the individual."241 
5.7 REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION 
To contextualize the discussion on reasonable accommodations in Canadian 
jurisprudence the court in the important case of Quebec v Montreal City; Quebec v 
Boisbriand242  did not discount the view that there must exist proof of a medical 
deficiency which results in a physical or mental impairment, however, the court was very 
clear when it stated that the medical condition should not be the overriding factor, the 
determining factor in the determination of disability. It is but one factor in the overall 
assessment and that of crucial consideration should be given to the social conditions 
and circumstances that give meaning to the impairment. The court went further and 
stated that the emphasis should be on the social integration of an impaired individual 
into society; that the focus should be on the obstacles created by society that obstructed 
an impaired person‘s integration into society. The Court drove home its point by 
emphasizing the social   effects of distinction, exclusion and preference as key, rather 
than the precise cause or origin of the impairment which is the want of disability 
jurisprudence in the United States.243   
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Hence, moving from this position where society plays a crucial role in the disabling 
process, Canadian jurisprudence is of the view, that it is society then who should correct 
these wrongs. It is society that should effect the necessary reasonable accommodations 
to properly integrate disabled people back into society. And in this case, the employer as 
a member of society is burdened with this obligation. However, it must be said that they 
are not without recourse. They can invoke the undue hardship defence to ameliorate the 
burden of accommodations that they have to make in respect of a disabled employee. 
In British Columbia (PSERC) v. British Columbia Government and Service Employees’ 
Union (―Meiorin‖)244 the Supreme Court articulated a unified three-step test for 
determining the existence of discrimination.  The Supreme Court‘s three-step test in 
assessing the validity of a challenged standard or practice, implores the courts to ask the 
following three questions: 
 
Has the employer adopted the challenged standard or practice for a purpose rationally 
connected to the performance of the job? Has the employer adopted the standard in an 
honest and good faith belief that it is necessary to fulfill the work-related purpose? And, 
is the standard reasonably necessary, in that it would be impossible to accommodate an 
individual employee without imposing undue hardship upon the employer? 
 
With the arrival of this unified test, discrimination analysis is now more straight-forward 
and more comprehensive. The three step test begins with a general review of the 
particular work performed, then moves to assessing the employer‘s subjective intent for 
creating the standard, and finally focuses on the accommodation of the individual worker 
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and the defences that the employer can erect to attempt to justify either the standard or 
its particular application. If the employer fails on any one of the steps, then it is in breach 
of its duty not to discriminate.  
 
The essence of the new approach in Meiorin has been to require employers to 
accommodate the characteristics of individual employees as much as reasonably 
possible, while taking a strict approach to any exceptions from the accommodation duty. 
 
5.7.1 The Extent of the Employer‟s Duty to Accommodate 
 
Several cases have highlighted the range and extent of the employer‘s duty to 
accommodate and a sample of these cases has been analyzed to show how the courts 
and tribunals have approached the duty to accommodate by employers in respect of 
disabled people.  
The employer bears the legal responsibility to initiate the process of accommodation245. 
The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal in Conte v Rogers clearly spelt out the extent of 
the employer‘s obligation to seek solutions with regard to accommodating a disabled 
person. The tribunal was of the view that more than mere negligible was needed to 
satisfy the duty to accommodate, since the employer was in control of the work-place 
and that at the very least the employer was required to find out what the current medical 
condition of the person was, when the person would recover and what the chances were 
for giving the employee alternative work. This was the least that the employer could 
have done in the circumstances. And the conclusion of the tribunal was that the 
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employer fell far short of this.246 This was also the case in Morris v British Columbia 
Railway where the employer was held to have discriminated against Mr. Morris based on 
disability when the employer terminated Mr. Morris following his return to work from a 
bout of depression. The Tribunal found that the employer failed to properly consider the 
medical input. The Tribunal determined that the employer improperly ignored the 
employee's input with respect to his condition.  
The adjudicator highlighted that the employer is obliged not only to properly consider a 
doctor's assessment with respect to an employee's fitness to return to work, but also to 
consider the employee's concerns as to whether or not his performance will be affected 
by persisting disability. 
The reason for the application of this imposition on employers is that employers have not 
utilized sufficient creativity, investigation efforts, or co-operation in devising an 
accommodation. In Deborah Marc v Fletcher Challenge Canada, Ltd 247 a British 
Columbia tribunal was of the view that employers have a duty to accommodate disabled 
employees and while suggestions from the employee in finding accommodation 
solutions were welcomed, there was no duty on the employee to find solutions this, was 
the sole preserve of the employer.  
And in several other cases it was found that employers were not vigorously pursuing the 
obligation to accommodate disabled people. 
 
In Metsala v. Falconbridge Ltd, Falconbridge failed to return a female employee to work 
in accordance with her documented medical restrictions. The Tribunal found that the 
employer failed to make appropriate inquiries and failed to gather accurate information to 
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assess the accommodation entitlements of the employee. Failed to understand the 
proactive nature of the employer's accommodation obligations (i.e. need to secure and 
properly assess all relevant input). Failed to appreciate the scope of the duty to 
accommodate; particularly that it goes beyond offering positions that an employee is 
currently qualified for. Erroneously acted on impressionistic assumptions about the 
employee's abilities and skills rather than securing and evaluating relevant information 
from the relevant parties, the employee and her attending.248  
 
And finally in Re Calgary District Hospital Group249 the considerable weight that the duty 
places upon the employer is once again demonstrated in the case of a nurse with a 
back-related injury was preparing to return to work. Her back injury had left her unable to 
perform several key aspects of her regular position, including the lifting and transferring 
of patients. The employer had determined that, because of her physical limitations, it 
was unable to place her into another nursing position. The union maintained that the 
hospital had not examined ways to re-arrange the nursing positions in order to find an 
accommodation. 
 
The arbitration board agreed with the union. It found that, although the nurse was unable 
to perform the duties of any of the nursing positions as they were currently structured, 
the employer had not taken the additional step of determining whether any nursing 
position could be modified to accommodate her. In its award, the board said it is not 
sufficient for the employer to show that its employee could not perform any of the current 
job descriptions. It must also be able to show that the job descriptions cannot be altered 
without undue hardship: 
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The duty to accommodate requires more than determining that an employee cannot 
perform existing jobs…Having determined that the Grievor could not perform any 
existing job, the employer was obligated to turn its attention to whether, and in what 
manner, existing nursing jobs could have been adjusted, modified or adapted – short of 
undue hardship to the hospital – in order to enable the Grievor to return to work despite 
her physical limitations.250 
 
As part of the remedy, the board ordered the hospital to: 
 
 ―…conduct a thorough examination of its work place in order to ascertain how, without incurring 
undue hardship, it can adapt or modify a nursing job (or jobs) so that the Grievor‘s physical 
disability can be accommodated.‖
251
 
 
The employer‘s duty to accommodate includes an ongoing obligation to reassess 
opportunities to accommodate as employment circumstances change. These changes 
would include an improvement in an employee‘s health, resulting in an unfeasible 
accommodation now becoming viable. Or it could include an increase in the staffing level 
of a workplace, meaning that an employer may no longer incur undue hardship by 
providing an accommodation. In Jeppesen v. Ancaster252 an applicant for a municipal fire 
fighter‘s job was initially refused employment because of a visual disability. At the time, 
the municipal fire service provided both firefighting and ambulance services, and it 
required its employees to hold separate driver‘s licences to operate both ambulances 
and fire trucks. The applicant‘s visual disability meant that he was able to acquire a 
license to drive a fire truck, but not an ambulance. However, when staffing levels 
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increased, and more firefighter openings became available several months later, the 
applicant applied again. He requested an accommodation – to drive only a fire truck – 
which the firefighting service turned down. An Ontario human rights board of inquiry 
upheld the subsequent complaint, ruling that the employer had never specifically 
considered whether the hiring of new firefighters afforded it an opportunity to 
accommodate the applicant by hiring him to perform firefighting duties only. 
5.8 UNDUE HARDSHIP 
What was the approach that Canadian law adopted when considering the possible 
undue hardship that the employer could suffer? 
An employer and/or a union are required by law to accommodate an employee, unless 
the required accommodation would result in undue hardship to the employer and/or the 
union. The Supreme Court of Canada, in Central Alberta Diary Pool253 and Renaud254 
laid out the important aspects of the ―undue hardship‖ test.  
 
In Central Alberta Diary Pool, the Supreme Court developed a non-exhaustive list of six 
factors that it said were relevant to what constitutes ―undue hardship‖. 
They are financial cost, impact on a collective agreement, problems of employee morale, 
interchangeability of the work force and facilities, size of the employer‘s operations and 
safety. 
In addition to these six classic undue hardship factors, an unarticulated seventh factor 
now appears to be emerging: the legitimate operational requirements of a workplace. 
While labour arbitrators and human rights tribunals have not yet formalized this new 
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factor, recent decisions indicate an allowance for undue hardship in the workplace that 
does not easily fit within the classic six factors. 
 
A labour board or human rights tribunal that is applying these factors will balance them 
with the right of the employee seeking an accommodation to be free from discrimination. 
Rarely will all of these factors come into play in any one single case. While the Supreme 
Court itself did not lay out these undue hardship factors 
in any order of importance, it is clear from the subsequent case law that some of these 
factors have significantly more weight than others. Financial cost, safety, and the size of 
the employer‘s operations are frequently invoked by employers, and legal decision-
makers have treated them with some consideration. 
 
Provisions of a collective agreement have been given an intermediate importance, as 
have the legitimate operational requirements of a workplace. Relatively little regard has 
been given to the defence of employee morale. The issue of the interchangeability of the 
workforce and operations has generally been subsumed within the size of the employer 
factor. 
 
As noted earlier, the amount of hardship to satisfy the accommodation duty must be 
substantial. Renaud involved a case of religious accommodation, but the ruling applies 
equally to issues of disability. The Supreme Court emphasized that an accommodation 
request which involved some inconvenience or operational upset would be insufficient to 
meet the test. In Renaud, the Court said: 
 
More than mere negligible effort is required to satisfy the duty to accommodate. The use 
of the term ‗undue‘ infers that some hardship is acceptable; it is only ‗undue‘ hardship 
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that satisfies this test….Minor interference or inconvenience is the price to be paid for 
religious freedom in a multicultural society.255 
 
The various factors have been commented upon in various accommodation decisions 
during the past 10 years: 
 
Financial cost is the most common factor cited by an employer when raising an undue 
hardship defence. Cost is a factor very much tied to the size and viability of the 
enterprise. As with the other factors, the employer would have to prove that the cost 
would be substantial in order to be found to be ―undue.‖ In Quesnel v. London 
Educational Health Centre, an Ontario Board of Inquiry under the Human Rights Code 
stated that: 
 
―…cost would amount to undue hardship only if it would alter the essential nature or substantially 
affect the viability of the enterprise responsible for the accommodation.‖
256
 
 
And in Re Zettel Manufacturing Ltd.  
 
Arbitrator Reilly stated that: 
 
―If the Employer was able to show a high level of pervasive, irresolvable financial distress and 
corporate insecurity attributable to the accommodation, the level of harm may then be such that 
the business could no longer accommodate the Grievor‘s illness…‖
257
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The Supreme Court of Canada, in Grismer v. British Columbia Superintendent of Motor 
Vehicles258 has recently offered a more imprecise assessment of cost, but warned that 
the courts must be cautious about accepting a low threshold: 
 
…one must be wary of putting too low a value on accommodating the disabled. It is all 
too easy to cite increased cost as a reason for refusing to accord the disabled equal 
treatment. 
 
Furthermore, an employer seeking to argue that a proposed accommodation could not 
have been accomplished without substantial costs amounting to undue hardship must be 
prepared to detail their case with detailed financial and accounting evidence. The 
Supreme Court of Canada stated in Grismer that  
 
―impressionistic evidence of increased expense will not generally suffice.‖ 
 
Finally, factors such as the financial cost of methods of accommodation are to be 
applied with common sense and flexibility in the context of the factual situation of any 
particular case. The Supreme Court of Canada observed in Chambly v. Bergevin259 that 
what may be entirely reasonable in times of prosperity could impose an unreasonable 
financial burden upon an employer in times of economic restraint. 
 
In sum, costs will only amount to an undue hardship if they can be established to be: 
- Related to the accommodation; 
- Provable, and not based on surmise or speculation; and 
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- So substantial that they would either change the essential nature of the operation, or 
-Substantially impact upon its financial viability. 
In conclusion, the argument in this chapter demonstrated in stark contrast, the approach 
to disability that the Canadians adopt. It is an approach that is grounded in substantive 
equality; premised on a purposive interpretive approach that highlighted the need for a 
wide interpretation of disability; which emphasized the discrimination that the disabled 
person rather than being focused on whether the person is disabled or not as a first 
enquiry. This chapter also, served to show the social model orientations of Canadian 
disability jurisprudence which addressed the attitudes and stereotypes that society 
constructs when discriminating against disabled people, therefore squarely locating the 
discrimination of disabled people within the realm of society. An exercise in method was 
employed by utilizing the Levac case to illustrate how, in the main, Canadian 
jurisprudence approached disability discrimination not as an enquiry about whether a 
person was impaired or not; but rather whether a person has suffered discrimination as a 
result of an impairment which in the final analysis amounts to a disability.  And, finally, 
the concepts reasonable accommodation and undue hardship were investigated which 
distinguished the Canadian approach markedly from the strict American approach which 
downplays the discrimination that the disabled person suffered.   
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CHAPTER 6: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR A SOUTH AFRICAN DISABILITY LAW. 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Statistics show illuminatingly the discrepancy between the prevalence of disabled people 
and their access to the open labour market. In its survey of October 1995 the Central 
Statistical Services reported that the prevalence of disabled people in South Africa was 
5% of the total population of 40 million and of this 5% it was estimated that 99% of them 
were excluded from the open labour market i.e. roughly 1.9 million people.260  
 
The Development Bank of Southern Africa in their research on the employment of 
disabled people made some interesting discoveries with regard to the plight of disabled 
people in the work place. Although, the aim of the research was not statistically 
representative, their sample of major corporations261 in South Africa and their responses 
to how able-bodied employees perceived disabled people in the work place was 
illuminating.  
 
In the words of the report: 
 
―Disabled respondents indicated the response that able bodied employees and managers 
frequently have a judgmental and rejecting attitude towards disabled people. This perception has 
lead to disabled people feeling isolated and separate. Thus 60% of disabled people interviewed 
have not been integrated into the mainstream work environment despite many years of service. 
As a result feelings of anger and frustration emerge from their lack of acceptance as people first 
and then as people with disabilities. This in turn reinforces the sense of failure. As there seems 
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little room for expression, respondents seem either to avoid challenging the status quo or become 
disconnected from the work place as a coping mechanism. Depression is prevalent . . .  [and] 
may be ascribed, not to their disability but to a lack of emotional connection and accommodation 
at work.‖
262
   
 
This chapter sets out to address what the possible implications are for disabled people in 
the workplace particularly around the question of dismissal. What needs to be 
understood at the outset is that the experiences of disabled people in the workplace are 
deeply rooted in society, it is an issue with deep rooted social consequences. And some 
of those consequences are the dismissal of disabled people in the work-place. Because 
of the economic and social structure of South African society which is capitalist in 
orientation, employers constantly need to increase their profit margins, and to do this 
they need a constant supply of able-bodied workers. Hence, people who become 
incapacitated in that they could not perform the essential requirements of the job were 
dismissed after half-hearted attempts at accommodation263were summarily dismissed, 
or, were just summarily dismissed based on a pretext after discovering that the person in 
question suffered from epilepsy.264 
 
The point of this chapter is that dismissal, because of the disabling of an impaired 
person is discriminatory and unfair in the extreme given the hurdles and obstacles they 
have to overcome to become gainfully employed.   
 
Therefore the question for this inquiry is to establish how best at a legal level society is 
able to deal with the particular work problems that disabled people are beset with daily, 
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be they structural and systemic in terms of how the work environment is structured, or 
whether these problems are based on discriminatory perceptions and attitudes from 
able-bodied workers and employers.  Also, if questions around dismissals and the 
equitable treatment of disabled people in the work –place are to be addressed, then 
questions of properly defining what it means to be disabled are paramount, and 
principally and fundamentally this is the objective of this chapter. 
 
And in addressing this question it will be argued that the answer lies in Charles 
Ngwena‘s novel idea of constructing a legal notion of disability. This discussion, 
however, will first deal with the vexing question that needs clarity and that is the question 
surrounding incapacity and disability. It is advocated that a clean conceptual break has 
to be made to understand disability as social model construct, and not as an impairment 
reduced concept, which manifests itself as an impairment based concept termed 
incapacity in South African labour law.  
 
6.2 DEFINING AND DELIMITING INCAPACITY AND “DISABILITY”. 
 
To begin the discussion, South African disability law is in its infancy. There are only two 
reported Labour Court cases265 that have dealt with questions of disability. Most other 
cases266 have been decided on incapacity. Also, South African text book writers267 have 
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not dealt with the understanding of disability in systematic fashion. On the one hand they 
have emasculated its explanatory power by understanding it as incapacity and on the 
other hand there is recognition that the two concepts are different.  Marylyn Christianson 
and others, hold this view that there is indeed a conceptual difference between disability 
and incapacity.268  
 
6.2.1 INCAPACITY: LABOUR RELATIONS ACT 
 
To begin the discussion it would be important to how incapacity has been used in South 
African labour jurisprudence generally. 
 
Incapacity in South African labour jurisprudence means that: 
 
―. . . the employee is not able to meet the standard of performance required by the employer – in 
other words the employee is not capable of doing the work‖
269
 
 
Also, generally there are two broad types of incapacity, namely, poor work performance 
and ill health and injury, for this inquiry only ill-health and injury will be considered270 
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An employee may be unable to do the work because of ill-health or injury which resulted 
from a motor vehicle accident, deterioration in sight or hearing, alcohol or drug abuse. 
Also, the incapacity may be temporary or permanent, total or partial.271 
 
In some cases medical intervention by way of a medical practitioner or a psychologist 
might be needed to establish medically whether in fact the employee is in fact capable of 
doing the job.272 
 
The Labour Relations Act (LRA) states that such a person can be dismissed fairly if 
there is a fair reason for his dismissal. And a fair reason for the LRA is, if the dismissal is 
related to the employee‘s capacity and that a fair procedure had been followed in the 
dismissal of the person who for injury or ill-health cannot perform the essential 
requirements of the job.273 
 
6.2.2 DISBILITY IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW: EEA 
 
The Employment Equity Act274 defines a people with disabilities as: 
―…people who have long term or recurring physical or mental impairments which substantially 
limits the prospects of entry into, or advancement in employment‖
275
 
 
6.3 THE CONCEPTUAL ENMESHING OF INCAPACITY AND “DISABILITY”. 
When one takes into consideration the two descriptions put forward of incapacity and 
disability in the respectively in the LRA and the EEA, it can be understood why there is 
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this inability to see this two concepts as cognitively different. And the crux of the problem 
is that, there are contained in both of these descriptions clear references to an inability to 
do something.  
 
For the Labour Relations Act an employee has an incapacity when that employee is not 
capable of doing the work because of ill-health or injury276. The Employment Equity Act 
and its construction of disability speaks about ―long term or recurring physical or mental 
impairment which substantially limits the prospects of entry into, or advancement in 
employment‖277  
 
When the key phrases of the two constructions are juxtaposed ―physical and mental 
impairment‖ and ―ill-health or injury‖; ―inability‖ and ―substantially limits‖ ―to work‖ and 
―advancement in employment‖ there are clear suggestions that these phrases speak to 
something about the body in a particular state, (impairment) and because of this state it 
is not capable of work (inability) or be employed or to advance in the work environment. 
(work).   
 
When these two constructions are distilled the conclusion that can be arrived at is that 
they both convey the unambiguous notion that the impaired body, because of the 
impairment it does not have the ability to work or to advance in the work environment. 
These notions are decidedly grounded in a notion of impairment and the effects it has on 
the disabled person‘s body in relation to being able to work. And other instances by text 
book writers, cases and legislation illustrates this point which is restated in the next 
section.  
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6.4 INSTANCES OF ENMESHING THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF INCAPACITY 
AND DISABILITY IN SOUTH AFRICAN LABOUR LAW: A RESTATEMENT  
 
In South African labour jurisprudence incapacity too, is a concept which views the body 
in a state of impairment.  And a notion that starts from that premise is one that has its 
roots in the medical model of disability which has implications for disabled people in the 
world of work because the understanding of incapacity in South Africa is that of an 
inability of the body to work.278  Adolph Landman underscores this when he says: 
 
―The concept of incapacity is a broad one. It embraces just about any inability arising from any 
cause…which gives rise to the performance of work which is below the appropriate or expected 
standard‖
279
 
 
Not only is incapacity an inability of the body to work, but an inability to work at an 
expected standard and that standard being an ability to perform the essential 
requirements of the job. 
 
According to the Department of National Health and Population Development of the old 
apartheid state quoted in an unpublished masters thesis280 (1986:3) 
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 ―a disability in the health context is any restriction or lack (resulting from an impairment) of an 
ability to perform an activity which would be regarded as within the range of any normal person‖ 
(my emphasis).  
 
The same thesis281 quotes Kettle as defining impairment as; 
 
 ―any loss or abnormality (my emphasis) of the physiological, psychological, or anatomical 
structure ‖ 
  
For the old Department of National Health and Population Development disability is the 
result of an impairment which renders the person with a disability unable to work as 
would a normal person. This construction of disability shows a causal link between 
disability and impairment. The state of disability is caused by impairment. And this state 
of being is abnormal. The impairment creates the disability and the abnormality. Hence, 
the comparison with ―normal person‖ infers that the person with a disability which 
resulted from an impairment is abnormal.  
 
 Kettle reinforces this notion that impairment is about the abnormal body when making 
these references ―abnormality of the physiological, psychological or anatomical 
structure‖. All these references are about the body as not being normal. 
Text book writers Van Jaarsveld and van Eck also show the same inability to distinguish 
between incapacity and disability when they talk about disability as something that 
inheres on the body and the following phrase lends itself to this kind of conceptualization 
“…where his disability was caused by a work-related injury or illness” 282“His disability‖ 
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suggests that the disability is present somewhere on his body which was caused by a 
particular injury. To be in a state of disability an injury must have caused it. Disability is 
caused by an injury.  
 
The inference that can be drawn from this conceptualization is that the disability is the 
non-functional hand or foot or the epilepsy. The incapacity, similarly, since it is used 
interchangeably with disability would also inhere on the body. Again the incapacity is 
seen as a rendering of a particular healthy limb or mind as impaired. In considering 
whether the specific requirements have been met before an injured person can be 
dismissed for not being able to do their work, a consideration that must be taken into 
account is the ―degree of severity283 of the incapacity‖. Once more the idea of incapacity 
is spoken of as synonymous to how injured the person is. One other aspect of the 
authors appreciation of disability and incapacity emerges when they refer to the 
procedural aspects that have to be adhered to before a dismissal can be effected, Van 
Jaarsveld and van Eck speak about ―…an employee suffering from incapacity or 
disability‖. The authors do not distinguish between disability, incapacity and impairment, 
these concepts are all the same, the real difference is whether disability, incapacity and 
impairment are physical or mental.  
 
To show a pattern which converges with text book writers van Jaarsveld and van Eck, A 
Metal and Engineering Industries Bargaining Council arbitration award to illustrate this 
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phenomena. In Tither/Trident Steel284 the arbitrator R Lyster, citing Mambalu v AECI 
Explosives Ltd (Zomerveld)285 had this to say: 
 
―It is now established law that the substantive fairness of the dismissal depends on whether the 
employer can fairly be expected to continue the employment relationship, bearing in mind the 
interests of the employee and the employer and the equities of the case. Relevant facts include 
the nature of the incapacity, the cause of the incapacity…the effect of the employee’s disability 
(my italics) …consulting with the employee about his ailment…‖ 
 
Once more with the introduction of the term ailment286 there is a further suggestion that 
incapacity and disability are seen as an illness that once again suggests that it is found 
on the body. For the arbitrator incapacity, disability and ailment are the same. And the 
reduction of disability to an ―ailment‖ again suggests that the conceptualization of 
disability has been clothed in a language that is associated with the medicalisation of 
disability that in South African labour law translates into incapacity. 
 
When one has regard to instances of legislation that deal with access to social security 
like the Social Assistance Act No 59 of 1992 a disabled person is considered to be: 
 
―…any person who has attained the prescribed age and is, owing to his or her physical or mental 
disability (my italics), unfit to obtain by virtue of any service, employment or profession the means 
needed to enable him or her to provide for his or her maintenance‖  
 
It has also been suggested that: 
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―The Social Assistance Act determines eligibility for a disability grant for persons who suffer from 
a physical and mental disability…which renders them unable to sufficiently provide for their 
maintenance. Other than linking disability with functional incapacity, these statutes are of limited 
utility in the determination of disability…The criteria that are used to determine disability 
under…the Social Security Act ultimately stresses incapacity‖
287
 
 
In these two quotes once more the same ill defined constructions appear with regard to 
incapacity and disability where the two terms are not clearly defined. They are linked to a 
bodily inability to work . 
 
Marylyn Christiansen when referring to items 10 and 11 of the Labour Relations Act‘s 
Code of Good Conduct: Dismissal states that:  
―The use of ‗disability‘ in items 10 and 11 would suggest that it is used interchangeably, or 
synonymously, with incapacity. No real distinction has been made between the two concepts. It is 
submitted that there are indeed distinct differences between disability and incapacity‖
288
.  
 
Charles Ngwena and Loot Pretorius agree with the observation made by Marylyn 
Christianson when they say that:  
 
―Employer‘s views about disability are often rooted in stereotypic assumptions about the 
incapacities rather than the capacities of people with disabilities. The tendency has been to view 
disability as coterminous
289
 with incapacity…‖
290
  
                                                 
287
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Ngwena and Pretorius are correct in their assumptions about how disability has been 
reduced to a notion of incapacity  
 
It cannot be disagreed with Marylyn Christiansen in her assertion that there is a distinct 
difference between disability and incapacity. However, her following observation is not 
well founded when she states that: 
 
―The code used the concepts of incapacity and disability interchangeably . . . and this is confusing 
. . . when disability has a very specific meaning for the purposes of equity in the work-place …a 
closer examination of the issues, however, indicates that incapacity and disability may lie together 
along a continuum [my emphasis] for the purposes of deciding whether a person is indeed 
capable of performing the required work to the standards set by the employer‖
291
 
 
Christianson posits a theory that incapacity and disability could be seen to be two 
concepts on a continuum. The concepts may lie on a continuum but there is no 
qualitative distinction made between incapacity and disability, 
 
 It is also, not entirely clear whether Christiansen is talking about a medical 
understanding of disability or a social model understanding of disability. If she spoke 
about disability in the medical sense then there would be no difference between 
incapacity and disability because they would conceptually arise from the same premise, 
namely, impairment.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
290
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If, on the other hand, Christiansen spoke about disability from the social model 
standpoint then there are definitely patent differences between the two concepts since 
they arise from two very different premises. As stated before incapacity is premised on 
impairment whilst disability is premised on the inability of society to reconstruct itself so 
that its systems and discourses are altered to accommodate impaired people. Ultimately, 
it is these rigid social structures and discourses that are the actual disablers of impaired 
people.  
 
On the face of it for Christiansen, the two concepts are different. However, she does not 
subject these two concepts to rigorous analysis to establish their essential difference. By 
suggesting that the two concepts are on a continuum she inadvertently opens up the 
possibility to construe these two quantitatively.  In that she sees a person going from 
incapacity, and over time when the incapacity cannot be medically corrected the person 
approaches the point of permanent incapacity or ―disability‖.  
 
The problem with this assumption is that there is a qualitative difference between 
incapacity and disability. Incapacity is rooted in a bio-medical orientation of disability 
namely, impairment. Disability on the other hand is rooted in how society perceives and 
responds to impaired people. These perceptions usually manifest themselves in notions 
of marginalization, stigmatization and discrimination. Therefore there is a conceptual 
imperative to define these concepts correctly otherwise the chances are that the 
understanding of disability will remain medically grounded. When this is perpetuated the 
role that society plays will not be addressed in its disabling of impaired people.  
 
Disability, in the final analysis, has become a particular discursive understanding of 
incapacity, the discourse of incapacity, that is, the particular language used to 
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reconstruct disability (as illness, ailment, impairment) which is a conflation of bodily 
impairment with a particular societal interpretation and construction of disability that is 
impairment, illness etc.  In effect a societal interpretation is reduced to a bodily 
impairment and then discursively termed disability. The point is that when people speak 
about a bodily impairment they reduce it to a common sense meaning of disability. But, 
as argued before disability is what society does structurally and discursively in relation to 
the impairment. Disability is not the impairment. Disability starts and ends in society. 
Impairment starts and ends on the body or in the mind or both.  
 
 Unlike Marylyn Christianson, Charles Ngwena292 ; Ilze Grobbelaar-du Plessis293  and 
Laurentia Truter294, on the other hand, view disability from a social model standpoint 
which does not reduce disability to an impairment. Disability for them is rooted in society 
and impairment is attached to the body, it does not lie on a continuum as suggested by 
Marylyn Christianson.  
 
And to illustrate this Laurentia Truter is on point when she criticizes the three ILO 
concepts295 of disability when she states: 
―All [these] (my addition) definitions have in common that they make use of a medical . . . , as 
opposed to a social concept of disability. .  .which defines disability with reference to a . . . 
medical model of disability. This model focuses on the effect the impairment has on the ability to 
attain success and be promoted or accommodated in the workplace. No mention is made of the 
role that structural and attitudinal barriers play in excluding people with disabilities from the open 
labour market‖ 
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 Deconstructing the definition of ‗disability‘ under the employment equity act: social 
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6.5 LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF DISABILITY.   
 
Arguments have been made that incapacity as a concept does not assist in the 
understanding of disability. The reason for this is that incapacity as argued above is 
premised on the understanding of disability as impairment which does not help to explain 
disability. And because of its strict focus on impairment it is based on the medical model 
of disability which does not take into account the role that society plays in disabling 
impaired people. 
 
Laurentia Truter points to the need for a social model perspective and its importance in 
the breaking down of physical and attitudinal barriers: 
 
―[t]he inadequacies of a purely medical approach to and definition of disability…is recognized by 
government in the White Paper on an Integrated National Disability Strategy…the proposal…to 
adopt a social definition rather than a purely medical formulation should be supported since a 
social model of disability supports the premise that the integration of people with disabilities 
entails the removal of physical and attitudinal barriers and not only cure. The necessary 
legislative changes should therefore be brought about to reflect this‖
296
  
 
Ilze Grobbelaar-du Plessis article297 goes further by suggesting the importance of the 
promulgation of a comprehensive disability act: 
 
 ―a comprehensive disability act that would reflect the necessary legislative changes in 
accordance with the social model…‖
298
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As these two writers have declared, if a comprehensive approach is to be adopted in 
correcting the shortcomings of disabled people in society then there should be a 
conscious programme for the building of social and legal institutions premised on the 
social model of disability. And the legal response to ensure this shift should be to 
construct a legal notion of disability premised on the social model of disability.   
 
The central task of constructing a legal notion of disability would be the eradication of 
discrimination in the work place for disabled people. The method to eradicate 
discrimination in the work place would be to take into consideration the role that society 
plays in the disabling of impaired people. Rather than medically diagnosing the type of 
impairment and the gravity of the impairment; the legal construction of disability should 
focus on the discrimination suffered by the disabled person. This should be the starting 
point; not the impairment. 
6.5.1 SUBSTANTIALLY LIMITING 
The problems that are experienced in United States disability jurisprudence are precisely 
because there is an over reliance on focusing on the impairment and the extent of the 
impairment. And not only is there an over reliance on the impairment as the determinant 
for disability, but the impairment should ―substantially limit‖ any of the disabled person‘s 
life activities. Only the ―substantial limitation‖ of any life activity will render a person 
disabled. And the United States Supreme Court has upheld this view on three299 
separate occasions.   
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In South African jurisprudence, the Employment Equity Act300, section 5.1.(iii) also 
speaks about a person with disabilities as being disabled when an impairment 
―substantially limits their prospects of entry into . . . employment.  
The problem with this definition is that it lends itself to the possibilities of focusing 
essentially on the impairment and the degree and extent that an impairment 
―substantially limits‖ This reduction of the inquiry to a diagnostic exercise to decide on 
how impaired a disabled person is, does not assist in protecting disabled people from 
being discriminated against especially in the work place.   
It would seem that being ―limited‖ because of an impairment is not enough to satisfy the 
extent of the impairment when considering whether a person is disabled or not. The 
person in question has to be ―substantially limited‖ if the person wants to be considered 
disabled. The primary objective of an enquiry of this nature should not be about the 
extent of the impairment and how limiting it is.  
Rather, the emphasis and focus should start from the discrimination that the disabled 
person suffered. And as argued in chapter two, discrimination is an activity that arises 
within society. It is society‘s discursive response to a person with an impairment.  
Society generally and employers particularly interpret impairment in a judgmental 
manner which translates into discrimination which ultimately marginalizes impaired 
people. This process of marginalization is the disabling exercise. The impairment does 
not disable; society when it practices discrimination disables. 
To restate, the reason for a legal construction of disability as anti-discrimination law, is to 
some extent to correct the asymmetrical power relations that exist between employer 
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and the disabled employee. If the disabled employee is to really enjoy the substantive 
equality enshrined in the Constitution, then an enquiry about discrimination of disabled 
people should not be about the severity of an impairment, that is, the ―substantially 
limiting‖ nature of the impairment, but should be leveled at the disabler found in society 
and in the work-place. As Ngwena so aptly stated: 
―To suppress the mischief of disability discrimination the focus should be on the conduct of the 
perpetrator rather than the degree or level of limitation in physical or mental competence‖
301
 
The ―perpetrator‖ in Ngwena‘s quote is the disabler because of the discriminating 
conduct when dealing with disabled people. To expand on this view, Christine Overall, 
states that people are not born as women, Aboriginals, elderly or disabled; rather people 
become these categories precisely, because of the intervention of human agency. These 
are identities that are constructed in the course of social discourse; reinforced and 
sustained through normative conventions and practices which are carried out by people 
in positions of power and in the employment relationship that power resides with the 
employer.302 
However, it must be stated that unlike other discriminated against categories such as 
women and Black people where membership to the group is clearly defined, with 
disability it is not always that obvious. A person suffering from bi-polar disorder is not as 
obviously impaired as a person who needs a wheelchair to get around, hence the need 
to subject the person claiming disability to a level of scrutiny to establish membership of 
that category.   
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 This may be so, but to subject the person to a meticulous diagnosis of the extent of the 
impairment to establish whether they comply with a bio-medical notion of disability 
detracts from the intention to eradicate disability discrimination.  
And if South African disability jurisprudence is to be mindful of the discrimination that 
disabled people suffer from, then, how it establishes whether a person is disabled or not 
should not be based on a searching diagnosis of the extent of the impairment and how it 
limits the individual. Ngwena supports this formulation when he states that; 
―The rationale for anti-discrimination law is to deter as well as to provide remedies for unfair 
treatment that is rooted in stereotypes, stigma and indifference. To confine disability only to 
persons who have severe disabilities or are substantially limited in their competence to perform. . 
. would be to miss the point by a margin. Disability discrimination is not invoked by a certain 
degree of impairment or limitation in physical or mental competence. Rather it is the result of 
unfair treatment, negative attitudes and indifferent social structures.‖ 
303
 
Hence, the ―substantially limits‖ clause contained in section 5(1)(iii) of the Employment 
Equity Act which deals with the definition of disabled people, should not be part of South 
African jurisprudence on disability discrimination. 
Ngwena undergirds this when he says: 
―What is not essential to the definitional construction of disability under s 6(1), . . . is the additional 
requirement in s 1 of the EEA and the Code of Good Practice that the impairment be substantially 
limiting‖ 
304
 
Establishing that a person has a physical or mental impairment which is long term and 
recurring305  should be sufficient to establish that a particular person is impaired. This 
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should be the only medical enquiry to establish whether a person claiming disability 
discrimination should endure.  
The crucial leg of the enquiry is the discrimination suffered by the person.  And the 
Employment Equity Act to some extent draws attention to this view point when it stated 
that: 
― the scope of protection for people with disabilities in employment focuses on the effect of a 
disability on the person in relation to the working environment, and not on the diagnosis or the 
impairment.‖
306
  
The Act draws attention to the effect that the work environment has on a disabled person 
in relation to their impairment, and downplays the focus on the diagnostic impairment 
oriented approach. There is an externalization of the disabling process, (the effect that 
the work environment) rather, than a focus on scrupulously diagnosing whether a person 
indeed has an impairment and to what degree and extent it limits the individual as far as 
work is concerned   
And this is where the court in IMATU v City of Cape Town307  erred. The facts of the 
case are that a diabetic was not allowed to take up a position as a fire fighter because of 
his diabetes. The City of Cape Town viewed his condition as being a risk given the 
severe conditions under which fire fighters had to work. He went to court alleging that he 
had been unfairly discriminated against because of his diabetes which he argued was a 
disability.  
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The findings of the court were interesting. Murphy AJ, came to the interesting decision 
that the complainant did not have a disability because he conscientiously controlled his 
diabetes. By coming to this conclusion Murphy AJ reasoned that since he could mitigate 
his disability he was no longer disabled. Not only did Murphy AJ conclude that mitigation 
of a disability trumped the claim to disability, he also, lent a large amount of weight to the 
substantially limiting leg in defining disability. And Ngwena raises this: 
―…the court said that there was no doubt that diabetes was a long term physical impairment, but 
it was not sufficient for the complainant to merely establish he had an impairment . . . in addition 
…it was necessary to show that in terms of its nature, duration or effects, the diabetes 
substantially limited the ability to perform the essential functions of the position of fire-fighter.
308
   
For Murphy AJ what is pivotal in deciding whether a person is disabled or not is whether 
the impairment is substantially limiting in respect of performing the essential functions of 
the job in question. He agrees that diabetes is a long term physical impairment but for 
him what is crucial is whether the diabetes is substantially limiting. If it is substantially 
limiting then the person is disabled if not then the person is not disabled. In this case 
because the complainant was able to scrupulously manage his diabetes and it did not 
substantially limit him he was not considered to have a disability.  
It must be submitted that the reasoning is not well founded in that a disproportionate 
reliance upon one aspect of the definition for disability could raise the possibilities of 
excluding a large part of the population who indeed have physical or mental impairments 
which are long term simply because the impairments are not substantially limiting. In Gill 
v Canada309 a Canadian case the approach to defining disability was quite different. The 
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analysis did not place primary attention on whether the applicant was really learning 
disabled or not. Nor did the analysis deal extensively with the nature of the bio-medical 
condition or closely scrutinize the degree of the applicant‘s disability. Expert evidence 
regarding the nature of the disability was presented to the tribunal and it was found to be 
sufficient. The focus of legal argument was not about the nature or degree of the 
impairment.  
And to augment this approach the Ontario Human Rights Code does not contain the 
―substantially limiting‖ clause which is found in the Americans with Disabilities Act and in 
the Employment Equity Act. It rather speaks about ―any degree of physical disability‖ 
rather than the restricting ―substantially limiting‖ notion found in the ADA and EEA. The 
Ontario Human Rights Code formulation is much more expansive in interpretation than 
the ―substantially limiting‖ construction of the ADA and EEA which is not satisfied with 
just being limited because of the impairment but qualifies that the degree of impairment 
should be substantial. 
The conclusion that can be drawn for disability jurisprudence is that if the jurisprudence 
is about protecting disabled people in the work-place then restrictive clauses like 
―substantially limiting‖ should have no place in our jurisprudence. If we are to heed the 
call by Ilze Grobbelaar-du Plessis that there is a need for a comprehensive disability act 
to govern the protection of disabled people then the framers of this legislation should 
heed the need to exclude restricting concepts such as ―substantially limiting‖ in the 
definition of disability. The lessons in American disability jurisprudence are instructive.  
 Since the EEA has fore-grounded the focus on the external environment as a key factor 
in dealing with disability discrimination rather than the diagnosis of the extent of the 
impairment as overridingly important; and together with Ngwena‘s reasons for anti-
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discrimination law being formulated to provide remedies for unfair treatment, a factor that 
comes into play for dealing with discrimination and the correction there of is the concept 
of reasonable accommodation and its correlative undue hardship. 
 For an employer to avoid the charge of discriminating against a disable person, it will 
have to be seen to have made more than an effort to reasonably accommodate the 
disabled person in question. Proper effect must be given to the substantive equality that 
is enshrined in the Constitution by putting a disabled people in the position where they 
can enjoy the right to employment. 
In the Standard Bank of South Africa v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration and Others310 the Labour court decision clearly set disability jurisprudence in 
South Africa on the correct path in how it approached disability by correctly focusing its 
attentions on the discrimination that was experienced by the person claiming disability 
discrimination and also locating the remedying of the discrimination in the use of the 
concept of reasonable accommodation. How did the court approach this issue?  
At the outset the court raised the issue around defining disability by stating that it should 
not be focused around the diagnosis of the disability (impairment). It was also of the view 
that a restrictive interpretation of disability rather than a purposive, wide interpretation 
would prevent the eradication of discrimination.   
The court used examples of job applicants who respectively mitigated their disabilities by 
using spectacles to correct eye problems or diabetics which took medication to mitigate 
the symptoms of diabetes to illustrate its claim.   
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The commitment to a wide purposive interpretation in defining disability is to be 
welcomed. The examples that the court used to explain the discrimination experienced 
should be treated with caution. It is not so much the restrictive interpretation of disability 
that brings about the discrimination but rather the mitigation of the myopia and the 
diabetes. What is the reason for saying so? If the myopia and the diabetes were not 
mitigated then the two persons claiming disability would be substantially limited. And 
since they are substantially limited they would be considered to be disabled.  
The test for disability is that the person claiming disability must have a physical or mental 
impairment, which is long term or constantly recurring and which substantially limits311. 
                                                 
311
  (i) having a physical or mental impairment; 
(ii) which is long term or recurring; and 
(iii) which substantially limits their prospects of entry into, or advancement in employment.  
5.1.1 Impairment 
Section 1 of the Act defines people with disabilities as "people who have a long-term or recurring physical or mental 
impairment, which substantially limits their prospects of entry into, or advancement in, employment" 
(i) An impairment may either be physical or mental or a combination of both. 
(ii) ‗Physical‘ impairment means a partial or total loss of a bodily function or part of the body. It includes sensory 
impairments such as being deaf, hearing impaired, or visually impaired.  
(iii) ‗Mental‘ impairment means a clinically recognized condition or illness that affects a person‘s thought processes, 
judgment or emotions. 
5.1.2 Long-term or recurring  
(i) ‗Long-term‘ means the impairment has lasted or is likely to persist for at least twelve months. 
(ii) ‗Recurring impairment‘ is one that is likely to happen again and to be substantially limiting (see below). It includes a 
constant chronic condition, even if its effects on a person fluctuate. 
(iii) ‗Progressive conditions‘ are those that are likely to develop or change or recur. People living with progressive 
conditions or illnesses are considered as people with disabilities once the impairment starts to be substantially limiting. 
Progressive or recurring conditions which have no overt symptoms or which do not substantially limit a person are not 
disabilities. (HIV-AIDS) 
5.1.3 Substantially limiting 
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Diabetes and myopia are clearly physical impairments they are long term or constantly 
recurring and they do substantially limit. 
In the United States two cases dealing with mitigated impairments are instructive. In the 
Sutton312 case the plaintiffs, two sisters suffered from myopia and wanted to become 
airline pilots and because they mitigated their myopia by wearing spectacles they were 
not ―substantially limited‖ in the performance of a life activity, namely working. When 
they do not wear their spectacles they are disabled once they mitigate their imperfect 
vision by wearing spectacles they are not disabled anymore. 
 This also applied in the In Murphy v United Parcel Service313.  The court upheld the 
plaintiff‘s dismissal on the basis that the hypertension that the plaintiff suffered, that 
when mitigated and controlled by the taking of medication which helped the plaintiff 
function normally on a daily basis, could not be considered to be an impairment that 
substantially limited the plaintiff in a major life activity because of the assistive effect of 
the medication.   
The point of the argument is that the ―substantially limiting‖ clause in the definition of 
disability is the key to being considered disabled. The impairment must be substantially 
limiting; once it is mitigated it trumps disability.   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
(i) An impairment is substantially limiting if, in its nature, duration or effects, it substantially limits the person‘s ability to 
perform the essential functions of the job for which they are being considered.  
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6.6 REASONABLE  ACCOMMODATION 
On the point of reasonable accommodation the court314 was quite clear with regard to 
the centrality of the concept in respect of achieving substantive equality and in so doing 
preventing discrimination against disabled people.  Accommodating disability as 
difference operates to prevent adverse effect discrimination flowing from employment 
rules, procedures or standards.   
It also brought to the fore that reasonable accommodation was any modification or 
adjustment to a job or to a working environment that would enable a person from a 
designated group (disabled) to have access to or participate or advance in employment. 
It warned that the Constitution and the EEA prohibited discrimination on the grounds of 
disability. Dismissal on a prohibited ground of discrimination was automatically unfair 
and implicit, therefore, in the duty to accommodate an employee is the employer‘s 
obligation to prevent discrimination. Hence, the consequences that flowed from an 
employer‘s failure to reasonably accommodate a disabled employee are that the 
dismissal of that employee is not merely unfair but automatically unfair.  
The point of making modifications or adjustments should be under-girded by a pragmatic 
common sense approach to explore, perhaps even to experiment, in the effort to 
establish what will work best in the particular circumstance of the employee, the nature 
of the post and the configuration of the workplace.  Then to sharpen its point the court 
was of the view that the standard adopted in Ontario was worth importing into our 
jurisprudence: 
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―The most appropriate accommodation is one that most respects the dignity of the individual with 
a disability, meets individual needs, best promotes integration and full participation and ensures 
confidentiality.‖
315
 
It again warned that the process should be interactive, a dialogue, an investigation of 
alternatives conducted with a give and take attitude. An outright refusal to accommodate 
showed a degree of inflexibility which was contrary to the spirit and purpose of the duty 
to accommodate. 
6.7 UNDUE HARDSHIP or UNJUSTIFIED HARDSHIP 
Undue hardship or unjustifiable hardship as the court chose was the right of recourse 
that the employer‘s had in respect of ameliorating its duty to accommodate disabled 
employees. The EEA Code defined hardship as: 
―Action that requires significant or considerable difficulty or expense. This involves considering, 
amongst other things, the effectiveness of the accommodation and the extent to which it would 
seriously disrupt the operation of the business.‖ 
For the court unjustifiable hardship had to go to the heart of the viability of the business, 
it could not be a minor interference or inconvenience. In Central Okanagan School 
District No. 23 v Renaud a Canadian case which dealt with extent of accommodation in 
a freedom of religion case the Court was of the view that: 
 
―More than mere negligible effort is required to satisfy the duty to accommodate. The use of the 
term ‗undue‘ infers that some hardship is acceptable; it is only ‗undue‘ hardship that satisfies this 
test….Minor interference or inconvenience is the price to be paid for religious freedom in a 
multicultural society‖.
316
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This however did not mean that the employer first had to be on the verge of bankruptcy 
before undue hardship could be alleged. It had to be an accommodation made on behalf 
of disabled employees that coursed significant or considerable expense which would 
seriously disrupt the business. Hence there needed to be a greater sense of 
proportionality when weighing up the interests of both parties when accommodations are 
made on behalf of disabled employees.  
To conclude an argument was advanced that the plight of disabled in the work-place is 
in dire need of legal assistance to protect them from the possible discrimination from 
employers. An argument was advanced that a conceptual break had to be made 
between disability and incapacity if the interests of disabled people are to be advanced 
in the work-place. I was also argued that a social model approach was preferred rather 
than an impairment focused approach.  The reason for this approach was that an 
impairment reduced approach purely focused on the impairment and its severity rather 
focusing on the discrimination that the impaired person suffered in the work-place and 
this was crucial for the advancement of disabled people‘s rights in the work-place.  
And finally, a legal construction of disability was advanced which was critical of the 
―substantially limits; phrase found in the definition of the EEA because, it was suggested, 
would restrict the number of disabled people from the protections of the law as was the 
case in American disability jurisprudence.  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
The aim of this enquiry has been to posit an understanding of disability that extricated it 
from the narrow confines of incapacity. It was also, an attempt to engage with the 
concept, disability at a much deeper level to help chart a progressive approach, namely, 
a legal construction of disability to combat disability discrimination in the work-place.   
 
In chapter two an attempt was made to show how disability was a socially constructed 
category with in a particular time –space continuum. And the time-space continuum was 
capitalism.  It was averred and supported by evidence that capitalism creates the social 
category, disability. Notions of normalcy, the medical model of disability and social model 
of disability were employed to show the systemic and structural influences capitalism 
plays in the construction of disability.  
 
In chapter 3 to deepen the understanding of disability discourse analysis was employed 
to peel away or to peer behind the cultural, linguistic, ideological, discursive veil of 
oppression that enthralled disabled people.  An argument was made that discourse 
definitely had a role to play in the peeling back of layers of meaning which hid the source 
of how certain groups with power dominated and ascribed roles and identities to others. 
The social model of disability which had its origins in a critique of capitalism and its 
preoccupation with structure could not explain the complex dynamics around identity 
construction. And it for this reason that discourse analysis was employed with the idea to 
delve deeper than the common- sense –taken- for- granted conceptualizations that are 
used to understand disability. Disability was a complex category and it cannot just be 
explained in purely structural terms there is the discursive element which needs to be 
drawn into the framework of analysis and deconstruction. The essential structural 
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analysis of the social model theorist alone cannot explain all the complexities of the 
construction of disability. And it is hoped that this chapter has brought this element to the 
construction of disability which is crucial for understanding it with the view to constructing 
a legal understanding of disability. 
 
In chapter four an argument was made that US disability jurisprudence was interpreted 
too strictly, resulting in the needless exclusion of a great many disabled people from the 
protections of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The literal interpretation as to what 
constitutes a disability with the ―substantially limiting‖ clause being the Achilles heel of 
persons alleging disability it is suggested should not be the path that South African 
jurisprudence should take. The use of the mitigation strategy to render disabled people 
not disabled as decided in the Sutton Trilogy of cases should also not be a part of South 
African disability jurisprudence. The use of a cost/benefit analysis to under-gird whether 
reasonable accommodations will be made or not detracts from the duty that employers 
have towards disabled people in the work place.  
In chapter five an argument was made to demonstrated difference in approach that the e 
Canadians adopt in their approach to disability. It is an approach that is grounded in 
substantive equality, which speaks to the ethos and tenor of the South African 
Constitution, and premised on a purposive interpretive approach that highlighted the 
need for a wide interpretation of disability; which emphasized the discrimination that the 
disabled person rather than being focused on whether the person is disabled or not as a 
first enquiry. This chapter also, served to show the social model orientations of Canadian 
disability jurisprudence which addressed the attitudes and stereotypes that society 
constructs when discriminating against disabled people, therefore squarely locating the 
discrimination of disabled people within the realm of society. An exercise in method was 
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employed by utilizing the Levac case to illustrate how, in the main, Canadian 
jurisprudence approached disability discrimination not as an enquiry about whether a 
person was impaired or not; but rather whether a person has suffered discrimination as a 
result of an impairment which in the final analysis amounts to a disability.  And, finally, 
the concepts reasonable accommodation and undue hardship were investigated which 
distinguished the Canadian approach markedly from the strict American approach which 
downplays the discrimination that the disabled person suffered.  It is in this vein that 
South African disability jurisprudence should be developed and fostered. 
 
Finally, in chapter six the position advanced that the plight of disabled in the work-place 
is in dire need of legal assistance to protect them from the possible discrimination from 
employers. An argument was advanced that a conceptual break had to be made 
between disability and incapacity if the interests of disabled people are to be advanced 
in the work-place. I was also argued that a social model approach was preferred rather 
than an impairment focused approach.  The reason for this approach was that an 
impairment reduced approach purely focused on the impairment and its severity rather 
focusing on the discrimination that the impaired person suffered in the work-place and 
this was crucial for the advancement of disabled people‘s rights in the work-place. And 
finally, a legal construction of disability was posited which was critical of the 
―substantially limits‖; phrase found in the definition of the EEA, because, it is averred that 
it would severely restrict the number of disabled people from the protections of the law 
as was the case in American disability jurisprudence.  
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